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“Sitting on a cornflake, waiting for the van to come.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 22, 2001,2 Ronald Rogers, a sexually violent predator 
(SVP) involuntarily committed to Atascadero State Hospital, went to a 
courtyard area within that facility, scaled a wall, jumped to the ground 
outside the secure fenced area, and escaped.3  A San Luis Obispo County 
Superior Court judge issued a warrant for Rogers’s arrest,4 charging 
him5 with escape and failure to register as a sex offender.6  A federal 
warrant was also issued charging Rogers with unlawful flight to avoid 
 
 1. THE BEATLES, I Am the Walrus, on THE BEATLES MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR 
ALBUM (EMI Records Ltd. 1967). 
 2. Rogers’s last pre-escape contact with a hospital staff member occurred at 4:30 
P.M. on Saturday, September 22, 2001.  Staff members conduct patient counts every six 
hours.  In the evening, staff thought they observed Rogers in bed, but the shape was, in 
fact, pillows.  On Sunday, September 23, 2001, staff discovered that Rogers was no 
longer on the unit.  Matt Lazier, Escaped Sex Predator Is Still at Large, TRIBUNE (San 
Luis Obispo County, Cal.), Sept. 25, 2001, at A1. 
 3. See Matt Lazier, Sighting Suggests Escapee Could Still Be in the Area, 
TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo County, Cal.), Sept. 26, 2001, at A1.  Rogers completed his 
escape by climbing down the roof of the single-story Administration Building, which 
was not fenced.  To prevent future escapes, a ten-foot tall fence with razor wire was 
subsequently installed on the roof of the Administration Building.  E-mail from Barrie 
Hafler, Public Relations Officer, Atascadero State Hospital, to Grant Morris, Professor 
of Law, University of San Diego School of Law (Jan. 3, 2003, 12:51:32 PST) (on file 
with author). 
 4. E-mail from Barrie Hafler, Public Relations Officer, Atascadero State 
Hospital, to Grant Morris, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law 
(Feb. 22, 2002, 09:32 PST) (on file with author).  Atascadero State Hospital is located in 
San Luis Obispo County, approximately twenty miles from the city of San Luis Obispo.  
A San Luis Obispo newspaper article, published September 26, 2001, reported that the 
felony arrest warrant was issued for escape and violation of the court order committing 
Rogers to Atascadero State Hospital.  Lazier, supra note 3, at A1.  A second article, 
appearing in the same newspaper eight weeks later, reported that Rogers was charged 
with escape, failing to register as a sex offender, and violation of the court order 
committing him to Atascadero State Hospital.  Patrick S. Pemberton, Escapee from ASH 
Faces Extradition, TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo County, Cal.), Nov. 20, 2001, at B1.  A 
third article, appearing in the same newspaper two months later, reported that the district 
attorney’s office was pursuing two felony charges against Rogers: for escape and for 
failure to register as a sex offender.  Patrick S. Pemberton, Escapee May Slip Through 
Loophole, TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo County, Cal.), Jan. 24, 2002, at A1. 
 5. Male gender pronouns are used throughout this Article.  They are used deliberately 
to reflect the fact that the overwhelming majority of "special" civilly committed mental 
patients who are the subject of this Article are men.  Male gender pronouns are also used 
when referring to a specific individual, such as Ronald Rogers, who is a man. 
 6. E-mail from Barrie Hafler, supra note 4.  Individuals convicted of various sex 
offenses are required to register with the local public law enforcement agency authority 
within five working days of coming into or locating within that city, county, or public 
university campus.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (West Supp. 2003). 
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prosecution.7  Ten days after he escaped, Rogers was apprehended by 
Oregon State Troopers, and he was returned to California.8  At Rogers’s 
preliminary hearing, the court dismissed the criminal charges against 
him because escape by an SVP is not a crime in California.9  Because 
Rogers was not “fleeing” to avoid a state prosecution for escape, no 
federal crime was committed either.10 
This Article considers the constitutionality and desirability of laws 
that criminalize escape by civilly committed mentally ill patients.  
Although escape by sentence-serving convicts is a crime in many 
states,11 escape by “regular” civilly committed mental patients is not.  
Nevertheless, some states criminalize escape by “special” civilly 
committed patients, such as individuals acquitted of crime by reason of 
insanity (insanity acquittees)12 and SVPs,13 and other states are 
 
 7. E-mail from Barrie Hafler, supra note 4.  Pursuant to federal statute, a person 
who travels in interstate commerce with the intent to avoid prosecution for a crime under 
the laws of the place from which the person flees commits a federal crime punishable by 
fine or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.  18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2000).  
This statute may be used either to prosecute the person for violation of the federal 
statute, see United States v. McCord, 695 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1983), or to “permit[] 
federal law enforcement agents to apprehend state fugitives, release them to local 
authorities in the state of arrest, and allow extradition to the state in which the federal 
offense was committed,” United States v. Love, 425 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977).  In this latter situation, the statute is used “to aid the state in obtaining custody of 
one of its prisoners” so that the prisoner can be returned to the state to face state charges.  
McCord, 695 F.2d at 826. 
 8. See E-mail from Barrie Hafler, supra note 4. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-10-31 to -33 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.300 
to .330 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2502 to -2504 (West 2001 & Supp. 
2002); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4530 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.40 (West 2001); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 719.4 (West Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-5(a) (West 
1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 205.05–.15 (McKinney 1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
5121(a) (West 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.76.115 (West Supp. 2003); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 946.42(2)–(3) (West Supp. 2002); see also 18 U.S.C. § 751 (2000). 
 12. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1026, 1026.4(a) (West Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 916.105, .1081 (West 2001).  In some states that have not enacted separate 
statutes criminalizing escape by insanity acquittees, courts have interpreted the basic 
escape statute to include within the criminal prohibition escape by insanity acquittees.  
See, e.g., State v. Flemming, 377 A.2d 448, 450–51 (Me. 1977) (holding that an insanity 
acquittee’s escape from a place of lawful detention, that is, a mental institution, is a 
crime under the state’s escape statute); People v. Walter, 499 N.Y.S.2d 280, 280–81 
(App. Div. 1986) (holding that escape by an insanity acquittee from a secure mental 
health facility is a crime under a statute prohibiting escape from a “detention facility”). 
 13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.927(1) (West 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 
229A.5B.1, .2 (West Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-70.18 (Michie Supp. 2002) 
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considering enacting laws to do so.  For example, in direct response to 
Ronald Rogers’s much publicized escape from Atascadero State 
Hospital, California Assemblyman Abel Maldonado, whose district 
includes that hospital, introduced legislation14 that would criminalize 
escape by SVPs15 and mentally disordered offenders.16  Both groups 
consist of individuals who were civilly committed to Atascadero State 
Hospital following completion of their criminal sentences.17  The bill 
appeared to be a logical extension of existing California statutes that 
currently criminalize escape by insanity acquittees18 and mentally 
disordered sex offenders.19  The California District Attorneys Association, 
 
(effective Jan. 1, 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.76.115 (West Supp. 2003). 
 14. Assemb. B. 1755, 2002 Leg., 2001–02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).  The bill was 
introduced on January 7, 2002 and amended on February 28, 2002. 
 15. In 1996 the Sexually Violent Predator Act became law in California.  See 
generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) 
(defining SVP and establishing the procedures for involuntary commitment, treatment, 
and release of SVPs).  The patient census for Atascadero State Hospital on July 24, 2002 
was 1085 patients.  Of that number, 302 were adjudicated as SVPs and an additional 139 
were being evaluated and processed as SVPs.  SVPs are the most numerous patient 
subgroup in Atascadero State Hospital.  E-mail from Barrie Hafler, Public Relations 
Officer, Atascadero State Hospital, to Grant Morris, Professor of Law, University of San 
Diego School of Law (July 29, 2002, 16:38:52 PDT) (on file with author). 
 16. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960–2981 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) 
(establishing the procedures for involuntary commitment, treatment, and release of 
severely mentally disordered prisoners whose mental condition, at the time of their 
parole or termination of their parole, cannot be kept in remission without treatment).  
Although commonly known as the Mentally Disordered Offenders (MDO) Law, the 
words “mentally disordered offenders” do not appear in the statutes.  The statutes are 
found in a portion of the California Penal Code entitled: “Disposition of Mentally 
Disordered Prisoners upon Discharge.”  On July 24, 2002, there were 264 mentally 
disordered offenders in the patient population of Atascadero State Hospital plus an 
additional forty-seven mentally disordered offenders being evaluated and processed for 
continued treatment and six others being evaluated for possible outpatient treatment.  
Mentally disordered offenders are the second most numerous patient subgroup in 
Atascadero State Hospital.  E-mail from Barrie Hafler, supra note 15. 
 17. See generally infra notes 113–17 and accompanying text (mentally disordered 
offenders); infra notes 288–90 and accompanying text (SVPs). 
 18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.4 (West Supp. 2003).  On July 24, 2002, there were 
sixty insanity acquittees in the patient population of Atascadero State Hospital.  E-mail 
from Barrie Hafler, supra note 15. 
 19. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6330 (repealed 1981).  Although the mentally 
disordered sex offender statutes were repealed in 1981, the California Legislature 
declared its intent to construe the repealing legislation not to affect any person 
committed as a mentally disordered sex offender prior to the repeal of the statutes.  Id. § 
6300 (repealed 1981) (Historical and Statutory Notes (quoting Act of Sept. 27, 1981, ch. 
928, § 3, 1981 Cal. Stat. 3484, 3485)).  Under the now-repealed California law, a 
mentally disordered sex offender was defined as “any person who by reason of mental 
defect, disease, or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a 
degree that he is dangerous to the health and safety of others.”  Id.  The term “sexual 
psychopath” as used in any California statute was declared to refer to and be 
synonymous with “mentally disordered sex offender.”  Id.  A person convicted of any 
sex offense could be subjected to mentally disordered sex offender commitment (for an 
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California State Sheriffs’ Association, the City of Atascadero, and the 
Office of the Attorney General all registered their support for the bill.20  
Although the legislature tends to react favorably to politically popular 
bills, such as this one, which promised a frightened public that dangerous 
people—violent repeat offenders and child molesters—would be locked 
up forever,21 this bill was not enacted into law.  In fact, the bill did not 
receive a favorable vote from the Public Safety Committee to which it 
was assigned.22  Assemblyman Maldonado asserted that by rejecting his 
bill, the Public Safety Committee failed to protect the public.23  “I’m 
afraid these guys don’t get it up here . . . I think the public safety 
committee should be renamed,”24 said Maldonado. 
 
indeterminate term) in lieu of a determinate criminal sentence.  Id. §§ 6302, 6316–
6316.2, 6327 (repealed 1981).  Although the mentally disordered sex offender statutes 
were repealed more than twenty years ago, on July 24, 2002, there were seven mentally 
disordered sex offenders in the patient population of Atascadero State Hospital.  E-mail 
from Barrie Hafler, supra note 15.  In April 2002, the California Committee on Public 
Safety reported that thirty-five mentally disordered sex offenders remained in 
California’s four state mental hospitals.  See Assembly Comm. Report on AB 1755, 
2001–02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Apr. 16, 2002), WL Comm. Rep. CA A.B. 1755. 
 20. Assembly Comm. Report on AB 1755, WL Comm. Rep. CA A.B. 1755.  A 
newspaper reported that the bill received support from the Atascadero City Council, 
employee union chiefs, and officials from the California Department of Mental Health.  
Matt Lazier, SVP Bill May Be Revived in 2002, TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo County, 
Cal.), Jan. 6, 2002, at B1. 
 21. An SVP is defined as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense against two or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes 
the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will 
engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) 
(West Supp. 2003).  Under California’s “Three Strikes” law, conviction of the crime of 
escape would constitute a third strike against a sex offender who had been previously 
convicted of two sex offenses, resulting in a sentence of twenty-five years to life.  CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 667(b)–(i) (West 1999); id. § 1170.12 (West Supp. 2003). 
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 
stated that it is a “well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than 
legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime . . . .”  Id. at 315.  
Thus, in his opinion, the enactment of legislation in a large number of states prohibiting 
the execution of mentally retarded persons was “powerful evidence” that mentally 
retarded offenders are categorically less culpable than ordinary criminals.  Id. at 315–16. 
 22. By a vote of two in favor and three opposed, the bill failed passage in the 
Assembly Committee on April 16, 2002, and upon reconsideration, by a vote of two in 
favor and four opposed, failed passage again on April 23, 2002.  Documents Associated 
with AB 1755 in the 2001–2002 Session—Votes, at http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acs 
frameset2text.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) (listing votes of April 16, 2002 and April 
23, 2002). 
 23. Patrick S. Pemberton, State Sex Offender Escape Bill Fizzles, TRIBUNE (San 
Luis Obispo County, Cal.), Apr. 17, 2002, at B1. 
 24. Id. 
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Fredricka McGee, Counsel to the Assembly Committee on Public 
Safety, prepared an analysis of Assemblyman Maldonado’s bill, and her 
analysis provided the rationale for the Committee’s decision.25  In the 
historical and statutory notes accompanying the SVP law, the California 
Legislature expressed its intent to commit and treat SVPs for their 
disorders “and not for any punitive purposes.”26  After all, as the 
legislature noted, “these individuals have been duly punished for their 
criminal acts.”27  A statute specifically declares that SVPs “shall be 
treated, not as criminals, but as sick persons.”28  The California Supreme 
Court found that the California SVP law was a nonpenal, civil 
commitment scheme.29  The Committee on Public Safety noted that no 
other civilly committed patient is subject to a criminal penalty for 
escape.30  When such patients leave without permission, they are 
declared AWOL, and when located, are returned to the facility from 
which they escaped.31  If SVPs were subjected to criminal prosecution 
for the crime of escape, they would be treated, not as other civilly 
committed patients are treated, but rather, as prisoners serving a criminal 
sentence.32  The “civil nature” of the SVP act could be challenged, and 
the law found unconstitutional for inflicting punishment on SVPs—a 
 
 25. See generally Assembly Comm. Report on AB 1755, 2001–02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
Apr. 16, 2002), WL Comm. Rep. CA A.B. 1755.  A nearly identical bill, introduced in 
the Assembly two years earlier (February 2, 2000) by Assemblyman Maldonado, 
received a nearly identical analysis, and a similarly unfavorable vote (three in favor and 
five opposed) by the Committee on Public Safety on March 28, 2000.  See Documents 
Associated with AB 1833 in the 1999–2000 Session—Votes, at http://www.assembly.ca. 
gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) (listing vote of March 28, 2000). 
 26. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (Historical and 
Statutory Notes (quoting 1995 Cal. Stat. 762 § 1; 1995 Cal. Stat. 763 § 1)). 
 27. Id. 
 28. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6250 (West 1998).  However, it should be noted 
that the statute also specifically includes mentally disordered sex offenders as persons 
who “shall be treated, not as criminals, but as sick persons,” id., and yet they are subject 
to prosecution for the crime of escape, id. § 6330 (repealed 1981).  Additionally, section 
6250 declares that “[n]othing in this part [dealing with persons subject to judicial 
commitment to mental treatment facilities] shall be held to change or interfere with the 
provisions of the Penal Code and other laws relating to mentally disordered persons 
charged with crime or to the criminally insane.”  Id. § 6250. 
 29. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 606 (Cal. 1999).  The California 
Supreme Court also noted that, consistent with the legislature’s intent to treat sexually 
violent predators as sick people and not as criminals, the SVP commitment law was not 
placed in the Penal Code, but rather was placed in the Welfare and Institutions Code, 
“surrounded on each side by other schemes concerned with the care and treatment of 
various mentally ill and disabled groups.”  Id.  The Assembly Committee on Public 
Safety also mentioned this statutory placement in its analysis of the Maldonado bill.  
Assembly Comm. Report on AB 1755, 2001–02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Apr. 16, 2002), WL 
Comm. Rep. CA A.B. 1755. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. 
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violation of the ex post facto prohibition33—when such punishment 
could not be imposed on other patients subjected to the state’s civil 
commitment laws—a violation of the equal protection requirement.34 
Does the criminalization of escape by SVPs threaten the constitutionality 
of the SVP commitment law, as the Committee on Public Safety asserts?  
And if so, does criminalization of escape by other specially civilly 
committed patients threaten the constitutionality of laws authorizing 
their commitment?  This Article analyzes those issues.  Part II explains 
why escape by sentence-serving convicts is typically criminalized, 
regardless of whether they escape from prison or from another place of 
confinement or custody.  Part III examines the civil commitment laws 
for specially categorized patients, such as mentally ill convicts whose 
term of imprisonment is about to expire, defendants in criminal cases 
who have been found mentally incompetent to stand trial, insanity 
acquittees, and SVPs.  Pivotal Supreme Court decisions involving these 
specially categorized patients are analyzed to assess whether criminalization 
of escape by these patients is constitutional.  Of particular interest is the 
equal protection argument: If regular, civilly committed mental patients 
are not prosecuted and punished for escape, can specially civilly 
committed patients be prosecuted and punished?  Part IV considers 
alternatives to the criminalization of escape that would assure the 
public’s safety while avoiding constitutional challenges.  Criminalization 
 
 33. Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no “ex post 
facto Law shall be passed.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.  Conceivably, such punishment 
could violate the double jeopardy clause as well.  The Fifth Amendment, made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall 
“be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. V.  In Hubbart, the California Supreme Court held that even if the 
legislature’s expressed intent is to create a civil commitment law, “a party raising an ex 
post facto claim is not precluded from demonstrating that the statute is ‘so punitive either 
in purpose or effect as to negate’ the stated intent.”  969 P.2d at 606 (quoting Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 
248–49 (1980))).  However, in Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001), the United States 
Supreme Court held that if a statute, such as an SVP commitment law, is found to be 
civil in nature, it cannot be deemed to be punitive in violation of the double jeopardy and 
ex post facto clauses simply because it is applied in a punitive fashion to a single 
individual.  Id. at 263.  The offended individual must look to a state law cause of action 
for relief, see id. at 265, or possibly challenge the constitutionality of the commitment 
scheme claiming a due process or other violation.  The Court expressly did not consider 
these other potential constitutional challenges in this case.  See id. at 266. 
 34. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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of escape by mental patients may be an unnecessary, and unwise, policy 
judgment if the risk of escape can be minimized through enhanced 
security measures to prevent escape, treatment opportunities that offer 
patients the prospect of release, and clarification of authority to 
apprehend and return patients if an escape does occur.  Nevertheless, this 
Article concludes by questioning whether public pressure to confine and, 
if possible, punish specially civilly committed patients will preclude use 
of these rational alternatives to criminalization of patient escape. 
II.  ESCAPE BY SENTENCE-SERVING CONVICTS 
“Escape” is defined as “a voluntary departure from custody with an 
intent to avoid confinement.”35  By criminalizing escape, the legislature 
seeks to deter such conduct by incarcerated individuals in order to assure 
“the integrity of custodial authority and confinement facilities.”36  
Additionally, escape endangers society.  To facilitate an escape, the 
prisoner may kidnap a hostage, kill a guard, steal a car, or rob a store.37  
The unpunished escapee may be more likely to return to a life of crime. 
Although the language of escape statutes varies widely, most statutes 
expressly prohibit escape from: (1) the custody of a specified law 
enforcement or correctional officer or such officers in general,38 (2) 
custody or official detention,39 or (3) specified detention or correctional 
facilities or such facilities in general.40  For example, to be found guilty 
 
 35. United States v. Nix, 501 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1974).  Even the dissenting judge 
in this case specifically accepted the majority’s definition.  Id. at 520 (Pell, J., dissenting). 
 36. People v. Davis, 212 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (Ct. App. 1985). 
 37. Nix, 501 F.2d at 519. 
 38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 751 (2000) (escape from the custody of the Attorney 
General); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4530 (West 2000) (escape from the custody of prison 
officials, officers, or employees); IOWA CODE ANN. § 719.4 (West Supp. 2003) (escape 
from the custody of any public officer, public employee, or any other person to whom 
the person has been entrusted). 
 39. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-10-31, -33 (1994) (escape from custody); 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.300 to .330 (Michie 2000) (escape from official detention); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2502 to -2504 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002) (escape from 
custody); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-5(a) (West 1995) (escape from official detention); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 205.05–.15 (McKinney 1998) (escape from custody); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 5121(a) (West 1983) (escape from official detention); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 9A.76.110–.130 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.42(2), (3) 
(West Supp. 2002) (escape from custody). 
 40. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-32 (1994) (escape from a penal facility); 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.310 to .320 (Michie 2002) (escape from a correctional facility); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 13-2503 to -2504 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002) (escape from a 
juvenile secure care facility, a juvenile detention facility, or an adult correctional 
facility); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4530 (West 2000) (escape from a state prison, prison road 
camp, prison forestry camp, other prison camp, or prison farm); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
944.40 (West 2001) (escape from a prison, jail, private correctional facility, road camp, 
or other penal institution); IOWA CODE ANN. § 719.4 (West Supp. 2003) (escape from a 
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of the federal felony of escape, the defendant must have: (1) escaped or 
attempted to escape; (2) from the custody of the Attorney General, his 
appointed agent, or from a place where the defendant was confined at 
the direction of the Attorney General; (3) where the custody was by 
virtue of either an arrest on a felony charge or a conviction of any 
offense.41  Because a person may be lawfully detained pending trial, 
conviction of the criminal charge for which the person was held at the 
time of escape is not required to convict him of the crime of escape.42 
Generally, courts have broadly construed statutory language requiring 
that for the crime to be committed, the prisoner must escape from the 
custody of a law enforcement or correctional officer or that the prisoner 
must escape from a detention or correctional facility.43  Escape can occur 
even when the statutorily specified officer does not have actual custody 
over the prisoner at the time of escape or when the prisoner escapes, not 
from the penal institution to which he was initially detained, but rather 
from a nonpenal institution, such as a hospital, to which the prisoner was 
transferred for treatment.44  For example, the Court of Appeals for the 
 
detention facility, community-based correctional facility, or institution to which the 
person has been committed); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 205.10–.15 (McKinney 1998) (escape 
from a detention facility); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.76.110–.120 (West Supp. 
2003) (escape from a detention facility). 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 751 (2000); see United States v. Vanover, 888 F.2d 1117, 1121 
(6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Edrington, 726 F.2d 1029, 1031 (5th Cir.1984). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 638 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
the defendant’s acquittal on a bank robbery charge for which he was being detained at 
the time of his escape was not a defense to the charge of escape); Godwin v. United 
States, 185 F.2d 411, 413 (8th Cir. 1950) (holding that the dismissal of the indictment 
charging the defendant with the crime of motor vehicle theft for which he was being 
detained at the time of his escape was not a defense to the charge of escape). 
 43. See generally Thomas Trenkner, Annotation, Escape from Public Employee or 
Institution Other than Correctional or Law Enforcement Employee or Institution as 
Criminal Offense, 69 A.L.R.3d 625 (1976). 
 44. Many, but not all, of the cases involve prisoners who were transferred to 
medical facilities for treatment of some physical condition.  See, e.g., Hornsby v. State, 
284 S.E.2d 630, 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the medical center to which the 
prisoner was transferred for back pains was a “place of lawful confinement” within the 
meaning of the escape statute); Best v. Warden, 201 A.2d 490, 491 (Md. 1964) (holding 
that the hospital to which the prisoner was transferred for medical treatment was “a place 
of confinement” within the meaning of the escape statute and that the guard did not 
abandon custody by leaving the prisoner alone to enable the guard to arrange for 
transportation back to the penitentiary); People v. Smith, 280 N.W.2d 862, 866–67 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the hospital to which the prisoner was transferred for 
medical treatment was included within the escape statute definition of a prison which 
includes “the grounds . . . under control of . . . persons authorized by the department [of 
corrections] to have prison inmates under their care, custody or supervision . . . outside 
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District of Columbia Circuit held that a convict, transferred from the 
District of Columbia Jail to St. Elizabeths Hospital, the District’s public 
mental hospital, was in the custody of the Attorney General even though 
the Attorney General and the Department of Justice had no control over 
St. Elizabeths.45  Because a statute authorizes the Attorney General to 
assign prisoners to institutions “whether maintained by . . . the federal 
government, or otherwise,”46 the concept of “custody” was construed to 
mean legal as well as actual physical custody.47  Similarly, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed as “quite without merit” the 
claim of a prisoner that the Public Health Service guards from whom he 
escaped while attending his mother’s funeral were not representatives of 
the Attorney General.48 
These decisions are not limited to federal courts applying a 
constructive custody concept to the authority of the Attorney General.49  
The Ohio Court of Appeals, for example, rejected a prisoner’s claim that 
the escape statute did not apply to him because: (1) he had escaped from 
a state hospital under the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental 
Hygiene and not the Department of Corrections; (2) that facility was a 
hospital and not a penitentiary, workhouse, or jail; and (3) he was 
confined at that facility as a patient and not as a prisoner.50  Because the 
statute specifically prohibited escape from any confinement or restraint 
imposed as a result of a criminal proceeding, the court held that a 
convict who escapes from a state hospital violates the statute.51 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the escape 
convictions of two prisoners who were transferred from the Massachusetts 
Correctional Institution at Framingham to the Westboro State Hospital and 
 
an institution . . . for the purpose of . . . medical care”).  For cases discussing escape from 
mental hospitals, see infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text, infra notes 50–56 and 
accompanying text. 
 45. Frazier v. United States, 339 F.2d 745, 746–47 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
 46. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-201.26 (West, WESTLAW through Dec. 1, 2002) 
(formerly cited as D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-425). 
 47. Frazier, 339 F.2d at 746–47.  Transfer of physical custody of a mentally ill 
prisoner to a mental hospital was held to be “neither inconsistent with, nor exclusive of, 
the legal custody of the Attorney General.”  Id. at 747. 
 48. United States v. Piscitello, 231 F.2d 443, 444 (2d Cir. 1956).  At the time of 
the prisoner’s escape, the guards were returning the prisoner from New York City to the 
United States Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky.  Id. 
 49. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 16 Cal. Rptr. 111, 112 (Ct. App. 1961) (holding that an 
inmate of Folsom Prison, assigned to a prison forestry camp, who left the work area without 
permission was under the constructive custody of a Department of Corrections officer and 
thus escaped from the custody of a prison officer in violation of the escape statute). 
 50. State v. Stapleton, 325 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).  With little 
discussion, the court rejected the claim as “without merit.”  Id. at 246. 
 51. Id. at 245–46. 
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who left that hospital without permission.52  In construing the state’s 
escape statute, the court “decline[d] to follow a strictly literal approach.”53  
Although that statute did not contain any explicit provision criminalizing 
escape from a state hospital, the court construed the statute to punish 
prisoners, whether they escape from a prison or a mental hospital.54  The 
court relied upon another statute that provides that a prisoner placed in a 
hospital or medical facility shall, during his absence from prison, be 
considered as in the custody of the officer having charge of the prison, 
and the time of confinement in the hospital shall be considered as a part 
of the term of the sentence.55  It would seem illogical, said the court, for 
the legislature to credit the prisoner’s sentence for time spent in a 
hospital, but not to consider the prisoner in custody for the purpose of 
being punished if he escaped from that hospital.56 
However, not all judges and all courts agree that a sentence-serving 
prisoner’s escape from a hospital, especially a mental hospital, 
constitutes the crime of escape.  For example, in the Massachusetts case 
discussed above, a dissenting justice admonished the majority for 
deviating from the principle that criminal laws should be strictly 
construed and not extended by mere implication.57  In his opinion, the 
“clear and only purpose” of the statute that considers prisoners placed in 
a hospital or medical facility to be in the custody of the officer having 
charge of the prison is to assure that the prisoner will receive credit for 
time spent in the hospital toward completion of the prisoner’s sentence.58  
To use that statute to criminalize a prisoner’s escape from a mental 
hospital, “unreasonably expands the meaning of an escape statute which 
on its face appears to specifically delineate the circumstances in which it 
will render an escape criminal.”59  Using similar reasoning, a unanimous 
Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the statutory grant of credit for time 
spent by a prisoner in a mental hospital did not satisfy the escape crime 
requirement that the prisoner escape from the “custody of any officer or 
employee of the state department of corrections.”60 
 
 52. Commonwealth v. Reed, 306 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Mass. 1974). 
 53. Id. at 818. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 119). 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 819 (Hennessey, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. State v. Burris, 346 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Mo. 1961). 
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In the District of Columbia Circuit case discussed above, a dissenting 
judge found that the transfer of the prisoner to St. Elizabeths Hospital 
effected a change in his physical custody.  Because St. Elizabeths 
Hospital was within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
and was “administered by the Secretary of that Department through a 
Superintendent responsible to him,”61 the prisoner did not escape from 
the custody of the Attorney General, as the indictment against him 
charged.62  Although the Attorney General has a residual right of 
custody when the prisoner is released from St. Elizabeths, the Attorney 
General’s custody is superseded while the prisoner is in that facility.63  
The judge expressed his belief that Congress had chosen not to 
criminalize escape by those confined in St. Elizabeths because those 
who escape from that facility are mentally ill.64  That thought is worthy of 
further consideration. 
If escape by a mental patient from a hospital is not a crime, and if a 
mentally ill prisoner transferred from prison to a hospital is a patient in 
that hospital, is there any justification for criminalizing his escape?  After 
all, the prisoner was not transferred for further punishment, but rather for 
treatment of a mental disorder that could not be treated adequately 
within the prison environment.65  In essence, a prisoner placed in a 
mental hospital for treatment is not a fit subject for punishment.  In so 
asserting, I do not claim that the prisoner is criminally blameless and 
could successfully use an insanity defense to avoid further punishment 
for the crime of escape.  Rather, the transfer to the mental hospital 
interrupts the punishment that the prisoner was receiving for the crime 
that led to his initial incarceration in prison.  Punishment is interrupted 
regardless of whether the state chooses to credit the time spent in the 
mental hospital toward the prisoner’s sentence.  Until the prisoner’s 
mental condition has improved to an extent that he can be returned to 
 
 61. Frazier v. United States, 339 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Fahy, J., 
dissenting). 
 62. Id.  Judge Fahy noted that the defendant was indicted solely under that portion 
of the statute that prohibits escape from the custody of the Attorney General and not that 
portion of the statute that prohibits escape from an institution in which he had been 
confined at the direction of the Attorney General.  Id. 
 63. Id. at 749. 
 64. Id. 
 65. The question of when a prisoner’s mental disorder is sufficiently serious that 
transfer from prison to a mental hospital is warranted is beyond the scope of this Article.  
Surely, many mentally disordered prisoners would benefit from treatment in a mental 
hospital and many would voluntarily accept transfer to a hospital.  See infra notes 76–82 
and accompanying text (discussing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), in which the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that an involuntary transfer to a mental hospital implicates 
the prisoner’s liberty interest but authorized fewer due process procedural protections to 
prisoners than to nonprisoners in the decision to involuntarily hospitalize). 
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prison to resume punishment, his status as a sentence-serving convict 
should be suspended, and the prisoner should be treated as any other 
mental patient.  If society does not deem it necessary to criminalize a 
hospital escape by a civilly committed patient diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia or other mental disorder, it should not criminalize escape 
by a convict patient diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia or other 
mental disorder.  The hospital can adequately protect itself against 
escape—either by “regular” mental patients or by “convict” mental 
patients—by imposing security measures appropriate to the patients in 
that facility.66  Those measures depend upon the pathology and severity 
of each patient’s illness, not upon a “convict” label that preceded that 
illness.67 
Research discloses that courts have rarely, if ever, seriously considered 
this argument.68  Although I am not confident that, if considered, it would 
succeed, nevertheless, it is surely worthy of consideration.  In virtually 
all cases involving sentence-serving prisoners escaping mental hospitals, 
the courts have simply construed the statutory language either to include 
or to exclude the conduct from it.  Courts have not considered whether 
convict mental patients can be punished for escape from a mental 
hospital when other mental patients—arguably similarly situated mental 
patients—cannot. 
In one case that briefly considered a prisoner’s equal protection 
argument, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the escape conviction 
of a sentence-serving felon who had been committed to and escaped 
from a state mental hospital.69  Although the hospital was within the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Public Welfare, the court ruled that the 
 
 66. Obviously, security measures are necessary to protect against inappropriate 
and dangerous behavior by patients, as well as to protect against escape.  Security 
measures are imposed when patients lack the ability to comprehend and respect the 
rights of other patients, hospital staff, and the community, should they escape.  See Grant 
H. Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the Confinement of 
Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction of the State of 
New York, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 651, 662 (1968). 
 67. See id. at 662, 678–79; see also Grant H. Morris, “Criminality” and the Right 
to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 784, 786, 796–98 (1969) (proposing that mentally ill 
prisoners be given treatment opportunities equal to those of mentally ill nonprisoners and 
that security measures be imposed only when appropriate to the patient’s condition, not 
his status as a prisoner). 
 68. For example, in  State v. Knox, 250 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. 1976), the court, in a 
one-sentence analysis, addressed and rejected the prisoner’s equal protection argument.  
Id. at 154; see infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
 69. Knox, 250 N.W.2d at 153–54, 157. 
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prisoner, despite his physical transfer to the hospital, was within the 
concurrent custody of the Commissioner of Corrections and the 
Commissioner of Public Welfare.70  Thus, the prisoner’s conduct met the 
statutory requirement that he escape while held “in lawful custody on a 
charge or conviction of a crime.”71  Although the court acknowledged 
that the prisoner was civilly committed to the mental hospital72 and that 
other civilly committed patients were not subject to prosecution for 
escape,73 the court summarily rejected the prisoner’s equal protection 
argument in a one-sentence analysis: “The obvious, and unquestionably 
legitimate, legislative purpose behind applying the criminal sanctions of 
[the escape statute] to [mentally ill convicts civilly committed to a state 
hospital] is to keep those persons in custody until discharged by due 
course of law by deterring and punishing escapes.”74 
A dissenting justice challenged the majority’s logic.  In asserting that 
the escape statute should be applied equally to all civilly committed 
patients—including prisoner patients—or to none, he asked: 
 If the purpose of the statute is to discourage attempted escape from a mental 
institution on the theory that the public is in danger from an escapee, why 
should the statute not apply equally to either patient, that is, one committed 
from a prison or one committed directly under a civil commitment order?  
Moreover, if the one under a civil commitment order who attempts to escape is 
not guilty of a crime on the theory that he is a patient in a mental institution and 
therefore should be deemed to not have the capacity to commit the offense, how 
can the patient there under commitment from a prison be any more responsible 
for his actions?75 
In some related contexts, the United States Supreme Court has 
suggested that states may distinguish between mentally ill prisoners and 
mentally ill nonprisoners.  In Vitek v. Jones,76 the Court acknowledged 
that “the involuntary transfer of [a sentence-serving] prisoner to a mental 
hospital implicates a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process 
Clause”77 and that “involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not 
within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence 
subjects an individual.”78  Nevertheless, even though both the convicted 
felon as well as the ordinary citizen are entitled to due process 
protections in the commitment process,79 the Court distinguished 
 
 70. Id. at 152–53. 
 71. Id. at 151–53 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.485(2)). 
 72. Id. at 154. 
 73. See id. at 151. 
 74. Id. at 154. 
 75. Id. at 157 (Yetka, J., dissenting). 
 76. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
 77. Id. at 487. 
 78. Id. at 493. 
 79. Id. at 492–93. 
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between the two groups as to what procedures are “appropriate in the 
circumstances.”80  For example, the state’s interest in avoiding disruption 
in the prison setting could constitute good cause for limiting the 
prisoner’s right to call witnesses, or to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, in the transfer hearing.81  The independent decisionmaker 
conducting that hearing could be a hospital or prison administrator.82  
Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide what procedures are 
constitutionally required for involuntary civil commitment of 
nonconvicts,83 obviously, the state cannot claim disruption in the prison 
setting as a justification for limiting those protections.  Just as obviously, 
a prison administrator will not suffice as the independent decisionmaker 
when the prospective patient is not a prisoner at the time of the 
commitment hearing. 
Although the state’s interest in avoiding prison disruption may 
distinguish the prison-to-hospital transfer decision for convicts from the 
freedom-to-hospital commitment decision for nonconvicts, that distinction 
seems irrelevant to the status of those patients once confined in a mental 
hospital.  If two such patients escape, should one be subject to criminal 
prosecution because he was transferred into the hospital from a prison, 
 
 80. Id. at 493. 
 81. See id. at 496. 
 82. See id.  Although a bare majority of the Court held “that qualified and 
independent assistance must be provided to an inmate who is threatened with involuntary 
transfer to a state mental hospital,” id. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring), only four Justices 
would require the state to furnish a licensed attorney to the prisoner.  See id. at Part IV-B 
(White, J., joined by JJ. Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens).  Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion that due process can be satisfied by an independent advisor who is not an 
attorney became the Court’s holding on this point.  See id. at 497 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
 83. However, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not permit a 
state to involuntarily commit a nondangerous mentally ill person who can survive safely 
in freedom either alone or with the help of others.  O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 
563, 575–76 (1975).  Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, wrote: 
 There can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, like 
involuntary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a deprivation of 
liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due process of law.  
Commitment must be justified on the basis of a legitimate state interest, and 
the reasons for committing a particular individual must be established in an 
appropriate proceeding.  Equally important, confinement must cease when 
those reasons no longer exist. 
Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979) (holding that in a civil commitment proceeding, the state is 
required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person is both mentally ill 
and dangerous). 
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while the other, who may pose an equal or even greater danger to 
society, not be subject to prosecution because he was committed to the 
hospital as too dangerous to live in society?  Vitek provides no answer. 
In Washington v. Harper,84 the Supreme Court considered whether 
antipsychotic drugs may be administered involuntarily to a mentally ill 
prisoner.  The Court held: “[G]iven the requirements of the prison 
environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison 
inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against 
his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment 
is in the inmate’s medical interest.”85  Further, the Court ruled that the 
prisoner was not entitled to a judicial hearing to determine whether he 
was competent to refuse medication86 and upheld administrative hearing 
procedures in which a hearing committee, composed of a psychiatrist, 
psychologist, and the associate superintendent of the facility,87 reviews the 
medical treatment decision.88  To distinguish prisoners from nonprisoners, 
the Court in Vitek relied upon the state’s legitimate interest in avoiding 
prison disruption.89  To distinguish prisoners from nonprisoners, the 
Court in Harper relied upon the state’s legitimate interest in reducing 
danger posed by prisoners in the prison environment.90  A prison 
 
 84. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 85. Id. at 227. 
 86. See id. at 222, 226, 228. 
 87. Id. at 215.  Harper was confined in the Special Offender Center, a Department 
of Corrections correctional institute established “to diagnose and treat convicted felons 
with serious mental disorders.”  Id. at 214. 
 88. Id. at 232–33.  The committee reviews the medical decision that the prisoner 
has a mental disorder that is likely to cause harm if not treated and that treatment is in the 
prisoner’s medical interests given the legitimate need of the prisoner’s institutional 
confinement.  See id. at 222. 
 89. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980); see also supra notes 76-82 and 
accompanying text. 
 90. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.  Less than a year after its Harper decision, however, 
the Court hinted that its Harper precedent might be applicable to a treatment refusal 
situation that did not involve danger posed by a prisoner to himself or others.  In Perry v. 
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (per curiam), the Court vacated a Louisiana trial court 
decision that had ordered a death row inmate to be treated involuntarily with 
psychotropic medication to restore him to competency to be executed.  See State v. 
Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747 (La. 1992).  The Supreme Court ordered reconsideration in 
light of Harper.  Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. at 38.  Was the Court suggesting that 
mentally disordered prisoners cannot be treated involuntarily if they are not dangerous?  
Was the Court suggesting that dangerousness is not the only justification for treatment of 
mentally disordered prisoners?  Was the Court suggesting that proof of dangerousness 
may justify involuntary treatment of mentally disordered nonprisoners?  On remand, the 
trial court reinstated its order, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.  State v. Perry, 
610 So. 2d at 747, 771.  The Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished Harper, holding 
that the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication for the purpose of 
restoring competence for execution “does not constitute medical treatment but forms part 
of the capital punishment sought to be executed by the state.”  Id. at 753.  The court 
found violations of both the state and federal constitutions.  Id. at 755. 
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regulation that is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 
will be upheld as valid even if it infringes on prisoners’ constitutional 
rights.91  Because prisoners have “a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial 
criminal, and often violent, conduct,”92 the state’s interest in combating 
the danger posed by prisoners—both to themselves and to others—is 
greater in the prison environment than elsewhere.93 
In Harper, the Court did not specifically address the prisoner’s equal 
protection and free speech claims.94  Nevertheless, if due process can be 
satisfied by a prison regulation that is reasonably related to the state’s 
legitimate penological interest in prison safety and security even when it 
infringes on a prisoner’s fundamental constitutional rights, it is unlikely 
that equal protection and free speech claims, even if independently and 
fully considered by the Court, would succeed. 
Civilly committed patients generally have a right to refuse treatment 
with psychotropic95 medication unless they lack the capacity to make 
 
 91. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).  The 
validity of a prison regulation will be measured by the “reasonable relationship” standard 
even when the infringed constitutional right is fundamental and a more rigorous standard 
of review would have been required in nonprison settings.  Id. (citing O’Lone v. Estate 
of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)). 
 92. Id. at 225 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Harper sued in state court, asserting that the state’s failure to provide him with 
a judicial hearing on his competence to refuse medication before administering 
antipsychotic medication over his objection violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, 
and Free Speech Clauses of both the Federal Constitution and state constitutions, as well 
as state tort law which requires informed consent to treatment.  See id. at 217.  The trial 
court, the Washington Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court addressed 
only the due process issue.  See id. at 217–18 (discussing the trial court decision), 218 
n.5 (discussing the Washington Supreme Court decision and citing Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 
358, 366 (1988)), 219–36 (discussing the substantive and procedural due process issues). 
 95. In legislation, court decisions, and legal scholarship, the words “psychotropic,” 
“antipsychotic,” and “neuroleptic” are often used indiscriminately to refer to medication 
prescribed to treat people with major mental disorders.  However, the words are not 
synonymous.  “Psychotropic” is derived from two root words, “psycho-” meaning the 
mind or mental processes, and “-tropic” meaning changing or directing.  Thus, 
psychotropic medications include all chemical agents that act on and affect the mind.  
ROBERT J. WALDINGER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHIATRY 396 (1986).  Antipsychotic 
medications, also known as neuroleptic medications or major tranquilizers, are one type 
of psychotropic medication and are used to treat thought disorders such as schizophrenia.  
Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and the Washington State Psychiatric 
Association as Amici Curiae at 2–3 n.1, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 214 (1989) 
(No. 88-599).  Other psychotropic medications include antidepressants and mood 
stabilizers.  These drugs are used to treat mood disorders.  See WALDINGER, supra at 
397–98.  Lithium, for example, is used to treat manic-depressive illness and is classified 
as a mood stabilizer.  See id. at 434.  Because civilly committed patients have a right to 
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treatment decisions, that is, to weigh the risks, benefits, and alternatives 
to the proposed medication.96  Prisoner mental patients have no such 
right.  The Supreme Court does not deem mentally ill prisoners to be 
similarly situated with other mental patients.  The state’s legitimate 
interest in maintaining prison safety and security applies only to 
prisoners, not to nonprisoner mental patients.97 
But even if Harper allows states to distinguish mentally ill prisoners 
from mentally ill nonprisoners in the procedural protections accorded to 
a patient’s treatment refusal decision, the case is of limited precedential 
 
refuse treatment regardless of whether they have thought or mood disorders, 
“psychotropic” is the more appropriate word choice. 
In the 1990s, four new psychotropic medications—clozapine, risperidone, olanzapine, 
and quetiapine—were approved to treat patients with psychotic disorders.  These 
antipsychotic medications are called “novel” or “atypical” agents because they alleviate 
psychotic symptoms without inducing the extrapyramidal (neuromotor) side effects that 
typically accompany treatment with conventional medications.  See Douglas Mossman, 
Unbuckling the “Chemical Straitjacket”: The Legal Significance of Recent Advances in 
the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1039–40, 
1069–77 (2002).  Although courts have not fully considered the impact of these new 
medications on patients’ right to refuse treatment, Mossman asserts: “[I]t seems very 
unlikely that courts will undo the cautions and procedural protections embodied in 
litigation that addressed involuntary treatment with older, more noxious antipsychotic 
drugs.”  Id. at 1148. 
 96. Courts in many states have held that civilly committed mental patients have a 
right to refuse psychotropic medication in the absence of an adjudication that they are 
incompetent to make treatment decisions.  See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. 
Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201, 210 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that in nonemergency 
situations, antipsychotic medication cannot be administered to involuntarily committed 
civil patients without their consent absent a judicial determination of their incapacity to 
make treatment decisions); Rogers v. Comm’r, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983) 
(holding that involuntarily committed civil patients do not lose the right to make 
treatment decisions unless they are adjudicated incompetent by a judge in incompetency 
proceedings); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342–44 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that 
involuntary civil commitment, without more, does not establish that the committed 
person lacks the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of medication refusal 
decisions and that a judicial determination that the patient lacks that capacity is required 
before the state may administer antipsychotic drugs over the patient’s objection).  
Utilizing the informed consent doctrine, “virtually every court that has considered the 
matter now recognizes a ‘right to refuse’ psychotropic medication for institutionalized 
populations.”  RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 885 (3d ed. 1999). 
 97. For nonprisoner mental patients, however, the state could claim a legitimate 
interest in maintaining the safety and security of the mental hospital.  Would the state’s 
obligation to provide a safe environment for all involuntarily detained mental patients 
and for the employees at that hospital permit it to authorize involuntary administration of 
psychotropic medication without a judicial determination of the patient’s incompetence 
to refuse that medication?  In Harper, the Supreme Court noted that the prison regulation 
in question used definitions of “mental disorder,” “gravely disabled,” and “likelihood of 
serious harm” that were identical to the definitions used in the state’s civil commitment 
statute.  Harper, 494 U.S. at 215 n.3.  Do these similarities suggest that the adoption of 
the same regulation for nonprisoner mental patients would satisfy minimum federal 
constitutional requirements?  Harper provides no definitive answer. 
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value in determining whether mentally ill prisoners can be distinguished 
from mentally ill nonprisoners for imposing criminal liability if the 
patient escapes.  Although the prisoner is under criminal sentence at the 
time he escapes, the prisoner is not escaping from a prison at which he is 
being punished, but rather from a mental hospital at which he is being 
treated.  Who presents a greater danger to society, a prisoner-escapee 
who was medicated over his objection because such treatment was in his 
medical interest and was necessary to reduce his potential for danger,98 
or a nonprisoner-escapee who was civilly committed because he was 
dangerous and who was not medicated over his objection because he 
was competent to refuse it?  Obviously, the unmedicated nonprisoner-
escapee is more dangerous. 
Can it be argued that the state’s reversionary interest in resuming the 
convict’s punishment once his mental condition improves enough to 
permit retransfer to prison justifies criminalizing his escape prior to such 
improvement?  It could, perhaps, if the prisoner escaped to avoid 
retransfer to prison and resumption of punishment.  But the crime of 
escape does not require such a finding.  If prisoner mental patients are 
punished for escaping from a mental hospital when nonprisoners are not, 
they are punished because of their status as prisoners, even though their 
transfer into the hospital was premised on their mental condition, not 
their prisoner status. 
The individual’s status as a prisoner, and the state’s legitimate 
penological interest in punishing prisoners, appears to provide the only 
justification for laws that typically punish prisoners, but not civilly 
committed mental patients, when they escape from custody.  Although 
the distinction appears sound when applied to a nonmentally ill prisoner 
who escapes from the custody of a prison, it is far more questionable 
when applied to a severely mentally ill prisoner who has been 
transferred to a mental hospital for treatment and who escapes from that 
facility. 
III.  ESCAPE BY “SPECIAL” CIVILLY COMMITTED NONCONVICTS 
Part III assumes that, despite the concerns raised above, courts will 
 
 98. In Harper, the Supreme Court upheld a prison regulation that authorized the 
administration of antipsychotic medication over the prisoner’s objection if the prisoner 
was dangerous to himself or others and the treatment was in the prisoner’s medical 
interest.  Id. at 227; see supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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continue to criminalize escape by mentally ill prisoners from mental 
hospitals, even though escape by civilly committed, mentally ill 
nonprisoners is not criminalized.  This Part considers whether certain 
specially categorized patients should be equated to mentally ill 
criminals, and therefore subject to prosecution for escape, or whether 
they should be equated to regular, civilly committed patients, and not 
subject to prosecution for escape. 
A.  Sentence-Expiring Convicts 
In 1966, in the case of Baxstrom v. Herold,99 the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a New York statute that authorized, through administrative 
decision, the civil commitment of mentally ill, sentence-expiring convicts 
and their continued confinement in a maximum security mental institution 
operated by the Department of Correction.100  Under the statute, sentence-
expiring convicts were the only persons subject to civil commitment 
who were denied a jury review on the question of whether their mental 
condition met the civil commitment criteria.  They were also the only 
persons who were denied court hearings on the question of whether they 
were dangerously mentally ill, a prerequisite for confinement in a 
Department of Correction maximum security mental institution.101  
Writing for a unanimous Court,102 Chief Justice Warren rejected the 
assertion that a person’s criminal tendencies or dangerous propensities 
are established by his past criminal record.103  Equal protection 
“demands”104 that sentence-expiring convicts receive the same 
procedural safeguards that all others receive in the civil commitment 
process; they cannot be specially classified to avoid the standard 
procedural roadblocks to civil commitment.105  Equal protection also 
demands that they receive the same procedural safeguards that all other 
civilly committed patients receive before they may be placed in 
maximum security confinement—they cannot be specially classified to 
avoid the standard roadblocks to such placement.106  “[T]here is no 
conceivable basis,” wrote Chief Justice Warren, “for distinguishing the 
commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all 
other civil commitments.”107 
 
 99. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
 100. Id. at 110–11. 
 101. Id. at 110–13. 
 102. Justice Black concurred in the result but wrote no opinion.  Id. at 115. 
 103. Id. at 114. 
 104. “Demands” was the word choice of the Chief Justice.  Id. at 115. 
 105. Id. at 110, 114–15. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 111–12. 
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Although the Baxstrom Court considered only a sentence-expiring 
convict’s right to procedural protections in the civil commitment 
process and in decisions to place the patient in maximum security 
confinement,108 just six years later, the Court construed its Baxstrom 
precedent broadly, stating: “Baxstrom held that the State cannot 
withhold from a few the procedural protections or the substantive 
requirements for commitment that are available to all others.”109  If 
convicts were to be civilly committed upon expiration of their criminal 
sentences, the state was required to use the same civil commitment 
statutes—the same procedures and same criteria—used to civilly commit 
any other person and to commit them to mental hospitals operated by the 
Department of Mental Hygiene, rather than hospitals operated by the 
Department of Correction.  They could not be separately categorized for 
civil commitment purposes.110  After all, when a prisoner’s sentence 
 
 108. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 506–08 (1972).  In Humphrey, the 
Supreme Court applied its Baxstrom precedent to an individual convicted of the 
misdemeanor of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  In lieu of a one-year 
maximum sentence, he was committed pursuant to the Wisconsin Sex Crime Act to the 
sex deviate facility in the state prison for a potentially indefinite period, that is, initial 
commitment for a period equal to the maximum sentence followed by renewable five-
year commitment periods.  Id. at 506–07.  The Court ruled that petitioner’s contention 
that he was denied equal protection in the renewal commitment, which did not accord 
him a jury trial accorded other persons undergoing civil commitment, was substantial 
enough to warrant an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.  Id. at 508. 
 109. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 727 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 110. As a result of the Baxstrom decision, nearly 1000 sentence-expiring prisoners 
were discharged from confinement under the unconstitutional law that mandated their 
placement in maximum security mental hospitals administered by the Department of 
Correction.  Almost all of the 992 Baxstrom patients were civilly committed—using the 
criteria and procedures applicable to all other patients who were civilly committed—and 
placed in Department of Mental Hygiene mental hospitals.  Within a six-month period, 
79 were discharged to the community, 22 were conditionally released on convalescent 
care, 273 were reclassified to voluntary patient status, and 24 were reclassified to 
informal patient status.  Only six had to be transferred back to maximum security 
hospitals operated by the Department of Correction as dangerously mentally ill.  Within 
the following six months, an additional sixty-eight Baxstrom patients were discharged 
and only one was transferred to a maximum security hospital.  Morris, supra note 67, at 
793–95.  The results strongly suggest that psychiatrists: (1) overpredict dangerous mental 
illness, (2) are unwilling to accept and treat as mental patients those who are identified as 
“dangerous” or labeled as “criminals,” and (3) have the ability to treat such patients 
when they are integrated with and given treatment indistinguishable from that provided 
to other civilly committed mental patients.  Id. at 796; see also HENRY J. STEADMAN & 
JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE 55–161 (1974) (finding that 
the Baxstrom patients were not very dangerous and were successfully treated in civil 
mental hospitals and that, when released to the community, few displayed dangerous 
behavior); Morris, supra note 66, at 670–75. 
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expires, his debt to society has been paid, and the prisoner is no longer 
subject to further punishment. 
If no conceivable basis exists for distinguishing the commitment of 
sentence-expiring convicts from all other civil commitments—if 
sentence-expiring convicts cannot be separately categorized for civil 
commitment purposes—then no conceivable basis exists for 
distinguishing sentence-expiring convicts from other civilly committed 
patients when they escape from a mental hospital.  If other civilly 
committed patients are not prosecuted for such conduct, these civilly 
committed patients should not be prosecuted.  To do otherwise would 
violate equal protection of the laws. 
Although Baxstrom was decided more than thirty-six years ago, it is not 
just a viable precedent, it is a venerable precedent.  Baxstrom has been 
cited in over 500 court decisions, including eighteen Supreme Court 
decisions.111  In many states, statutes specifically mandate use of the 
regular civil commitment process to confine a prisoner at the completion 
of his penal sentence.112  Occasionally, however, a state enacts statutes 
that ignore, if not repudiate, the Baxstrom holding.  California, for 
example, has enacted statutes,113 commonly referred to by courts114 and 
commentators115 as mentally disordered offenders statutes.  Despite this 
characterization, the statutes are applicable, not to sentence-serving 
offenders, but rather as a condition of parole to sentence-expiring 
offenders who are about to be discharged from prison.116  If a court or jury 
finds that the person has a severe mental disorder that is not in remission 
or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and that the person 
represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others because of that 
disorder, the person can be committed for renewable one-year periods.117 
In a statement of legislative findings and declarations, the California 
Legislature justified its special classification of mentally disordered, 
sentence-expiring prisoners by asserting that if the prisoners’ severe 
 
 111. See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (WL KeyCite performed Mar. 
22, 2002).  The Supreme Court most recently cited Baxstrom in Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346 (1997).  Justice Thomas, who wrote the Court’s majority opinion in 
Hendricks, cited Baxstrom, id. at 369–70, as did Justice Kennedy, who wrote a 
concurring opinion, id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 112. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-226(H) (West 2002); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 330.2006(3) (West 1996); MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.050(5) (West 2002). 
 113. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960–2981 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). 
 114. People v. Fernandez, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469, 471, 475–78 (Ct. App. 1999); 
People v. Jenkins, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 502 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Coronado, 33 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 835 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 115. See, e.g., M.R. Carrillo-Heian, The Mentally Disordered Offenders Law: The 
Legislature Responds to People v. Anzalone, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 276, 276-84 (2000). 
 116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962 (West Supp. 2003). 
 117. Id. § 2972(c), (e). 
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mental disorders are not in remission or cannot be kept in remission 
when the prisoners are discharged, “there is a danger to society, and the 
state has a compelling interest in protecting the public.”118  Despite this 
rhetoric, the legislature failed to explain why that danger is any different, 
or any greater, than the danger posed by regular civilly committed 
patients or why the regular civil commitment process does not satisfy the 
state’s compelling interest in protecting the public from that danger. 
In fact, regular civilly committed patients may present an even greater 
danger than do special civilly committed, sentence-expiring prisoners.  
To be subjected to a 180-day renewable commitment hold in California, 
the nonprisoner must have attempted, inflicted, or made a serious threat 
of substantial physical harm upon another person that either resulted in 
the nonprisoner’s detention for evaluation and treatment or that occurred 
during such detention, and the nonprisoner must continue to present a 
demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm upon 
others.119  Although the “substantial danger of physical harm to others” 
commitment criterion is the same for both groups, sentence-expiring 
prisoners are subject to “special” civil commitment without any 
requirement that they engaged in a recent dangerous act or made a 
serious threat to do so.  And yet, even without such proof, the statute 
authorizes sentence-expiring mentally ill prisoners to be confined for 
longer periods (renewable, one-year periods) than are demonstrably 
dangerous, “regular” civilly committed patients (renewable, 180-day 
periods).  Additionally, unlike “regular” civilly committed patients who 
typically begin their involuntary detention in community treatment 
centers located in the county of their residence,120 sentence-expiring 
prisoners begin their “civil” commitment in isolated, maximum security, 
state mental hospitals, such as Atascadero and Patton.121 
California’s attempt to create a separate commitment category for 
sentence-expiring mentally ill convicts should not withstand an equal 
protection challenge.  Baxstrom simply cannot be ignored.  Ironically, 
another California statute specifically authorizes the Director of 
Corrections to initiate the regular civil commitment process for 
 
 118. Id. § 2960 (West 2000). 
 119. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West 1998). 
 120. See id. § 5150 (evaluation and treatment for seventy-two hours); id. § 5250 
(certification for fourteen days of intensive treatment). 
 121. Of the 1085 patients confined in Atascadero State Hospital on July 24, 2002, a 
total of 317 were either adjudicated as mentally disordered offenders or were being 
evaluated and processed as mentally disordered offenders.  See supra note 16. 
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sentence-expiring convicts who are dangerous to others, dangerous to 
themselves, or gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder, that is, if 
their mental condition meets the regular civil commitment criteria in 
California.122  This statute is a far more appropriate vehicle for 
processing any civilly committable, sentence-expiring prisoner. 
B.  Criminal Defendants 
The government has a fundamental interest in trying a defendant for 
conduct that it alleges is criminal.123  As Justice Brennan stated: 
“Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a 
scheme of ‘ordered liberty’ and prerequisite to social justice and 
peace.”124  Incapacitation of dangerous offenders is not the government’s 
sole penological interest.  Rather, as explained by the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, “the retributive, deterrent, 
communicative, and investigative functions of the criminal justice 
system . . . serve to ensure that offenders receive their just deserts, to 
make clear that offenses entail consequences, and to discover what 
happened through the public mechanism of trial.”125 
Although pretrial detention of arrestees is an exception to the societal 
norm of liberty,126 the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that denies 
bail and imposes pretrial detention not merely when the detainee 
presents a flight risk, but also when the detainee presents a danger to 
another person or to the community.127  In appropriate circumstances, 
the Court noted, the individual’s liberty interest can be outweighed by 
the government’s interest in community safety.128  Although the Court 
characterized as “compelling” the government’s general interest in 
preventing crime, that interest is heightened when the government 
establishes that the person it seeks to detain has been charged with a 
serious crime and “presents a demonstrable danger to the community.”129  
 
 122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2974 (West 2000). 
 123. United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2002).  The Supreme Court 
has described society’s interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate 
the law as a “compelling interest.”  Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986). 
 124. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 125. United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 1067 (2001). 
 126. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
 127. Id.  The Court upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984, id., that provides: “If, after, a hearing . . . , the judicial officer finds that no 
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial 
officer shall order the detention of the person prior to trial,” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2000). 
 128. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748. 
 129. Id. at 750. 
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In that context, “society’s interest in crime prevention is at its greatest.”130 
Because a person may, in some situations, be lawfully detained 
pending trial, escape from lawful custody prior to conviction may 
constitute the crime of escape.131  In fact, many jurisdictions specifically 
include within the statutorily prohibited conduct escape from custody by 
virtue of arrest for or conviction of a crime.132 
1.  Mentally Incompetent Criminal Defendants 
If a defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial, that is, is unable 
to understand the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in his 
defense,133 the trial is suspended until the defendant’s competence has 
been restored.134  In fact, the Supreme Court has ruled that the 
prohibition against conducting a criminal trial of an incompetent 
defendant “is fundamental to an adversary system of justice.”135  To 
assure that an incompetent defendant is not deprived of the due process 
right to a fair trial,136 the defense attorney, the prosecutor, and the court 
all have an obligation to raise the issue whenever reasonable cause exists 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 132. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 751 (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2502 to -2503 
(West 2001 & Supp. 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 719.4(1) (West Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:29-5(a) (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 205.00–.15 (McKinney 1999); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5121 (West 1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.120 (West Supp. 
2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.42(2)(a), (3)(a) (West Supp. 2002). 
 133. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2000). 
 134. See id. § 4241(d). 
 135. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). 
 136. The suspension of criminal proceedings is warranted to assure the accuracy, 
fairness, and dignity of the trial process and to justify the imposition of punishment if the 
defendant is convicted.  In many cases, the accused may be the only individual who has 
knowledge of the facts underlying the criminal charge, and thus, an accurate assessment 
of guilt requires the defendant’s assistance.  To assure fairness in the criminal process, 
the accused must have the basic capacity to assist counsel in presenting a defense.  The 
dignity of the criminal process would be undermined by the spectacle of an incompetent 
defendant’s trial.  The objective of punishment requires that a convicted defendant 
comprehend the reasons why the court is imposing punishment.  Barbara A. Weiner, 
Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, in AM. BAR FOUND., THE MENTALLY DISABLED 
AND THE LAW 693, 694 (Samuel J. Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985); Note, Incompetency to 
Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 457–59 (1967).  The suspension of criminal 
proceedings against incompetent defendants is “a by-product of the ban against trial in 
absentia; the mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, 
is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself.”  Caleb Foote, A Comment on 
Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960). 
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to believe that the accused is mentally incompetent.137   
If a mentally incompetent defendant escapes from custody during the 
period he is undergoing treatment to restore competency,138 may he be 
prosecuted for the crime of escape if ordinary civilly committed patients 
are not?  The issue has not received appellate court attention.  Perhaps 
prosecutions for such escapes are rare.  After all, to be adjudicated 
incompetent to stand trial, the defendant’s mental condition must be 
impaired to such an extent that he is unable to understand the nature of 
the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in defending against the 
criminal charges.  A New York City Criminal Court judge noted that 
prosecution of an incompetent defendant for escape would be futile and 
unjust because that act was likely to be related to the defendant’s 
incompetency.139  The court suggested that such prosecution would be 
“pointless” because the defendant “would likely not be competent to 
stand trial in a new action for escape.”140 
If the defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial at the time of 
escape, then a defense of insanity for the crime of escape may well be 
viable.141  If a defendant does not even know what a criminal trial is all 
 
 137. In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), the Supreme Court stated: “Where 
the evidence raises a ‘bone fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the 
judge on his own motion must impanel a jury and conduct a sanity hearing . . . .”  Id. at 
385.  The American Bar Association, in its Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 
approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1984, adopted a standard requiring 
the prosecutor and the defense counsel to move for the evaluation of the defendant’s 
competence whenever the prosecutor or the defense counsel has a good faith doubt as to 
the defendant’s competence.  ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 
standard 7-4.2 (b), (c) (1989). 
 138. Once the issue of competency to stand trial is raised, the court may order the 
defendant detained for an evaluation of his mental condition.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) 
(2000).  A defendant who escapes from custody while so detained may be prosecuted for 
the crime of escape.  Similarly, a defendant who escapes from custody when any other 
mental condition is being evaluated, such as an insanity evaluation that assesses the 
defendant’s mental condition at the time of the criminal act, is subject to prosecution for the 
crime of escape.  Because these individuals have not been committed for treatment of their 
mental disorder, they cannot be equated to other mental patients—whether civilly 
committed nonprisoners or sentence-serving prisoners transferred from prison to a 
mental hospital—when they escape.  Although a defendant whose mental status is being 
evaluated is not by that status alone a prisoner who is subject to punishment, the 
defendant is in custody and can be required to undergo the evaluation.  Therefore, a 
defendant who escapes in order to avoid either that evaluation or subsequent trial is 
subject to prosecution for the crime of escape just as are other defendants who escape 
lawful detention prior to trial.  See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text. 
 139. People v. Williams, 504 N.Y.S.2d 339, 342 (Crim. Ct. 1986). 
 140. Id. at 341. 
 141. If the insanity defense is available for other crimes, it is available for the crime 
of escape.  See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 628 F.2d 554, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per 
curiam).  In Wood, an individual was confined in St. Elizabeths Hospital after being 
acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity.  He escaped and was prosecuted for the crime 
of escape.  Id. at 555.  At trial, he relied upon the insanity defense.  Id. at 556; see also 
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about—that the defendant is charged with a crime, that the trial is a 
process to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence, that the 
prosecutor will offer evidence in an attempt to find the defendant guilty, 
that the defendant will be represented by counsel who will challenge the 
prosecutor’s evidence and offer evidence in an attempt to find the 
defendant not guilty, that a verdict of guilty will result in the imposition 
of punishment on the defendant—then it is quite possible that the 
incompetent defendant who escapes does not know, at the time of 
escape, the nature and quality of the act or that it was wrong to commit 
that act.  At a minimum, evidence that supported the adjudication of 
defendant’s incompetence to stand trial is probative on the defendant’s 
insanity at the time he escaped.142 
Although incompetent defendants have not been convicted of crimes 
and thus are not mentally ill prisoners, the state’s interest in restoring 
trial competence has been used to distinguish these individuals from 
other civilly committed patients.  For example, even though civilly 
committed patients have a right to refuse psychotropic medication unless 
they lack the capacity to make treatment decisions,143 recent federal 
court of appeals decisions from the District of Columbia Circuit144 and 
the Eighth145 and Second Circuits146 permit the government to forcibly 
medicate incompetent defendants if the medication is both appropriate 
and necessary to restore competence to stand trial.  Ironically, these 
cases rely upon language in Riggins v. Nevada,147 a Supreme Court 
decision that reversed the conviction of a mentally competent defendant 
who was involuntarily medicated during his criminal trial.  The record 
failed to establish that the administration of psychotropic medication 
was necessary to accomplish an essential state policy that would permit 
 
United States v. Tate, 419 F.2d 131, 132–33 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding that an indigent 
defendant who claims insanity as a defense to the charge of escape is entitled to a 
psychiatric examination at government expense). 
 142. In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), the Supreme Court held that a trial 
court’s finding, based on psychiatric reports, that the defendant was competent to stand 
trial was not only probative, it was determinative of the defendant’s competency to plead 
guilty or to waive the right to counsel.  See id. at 395–401. 
 143. See supra note 96. 
 144. United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 882–87 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 1067 (2001). 
 145. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567–71 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 
512 (2002). 
 146. United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 147. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
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the state to override the defendant’s liberty interest in freedom from 
unwanted medication148 and his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to a fair trial.149 
The Riggins majority did not delineate with finality the substantive 
standards that govern the forced medication of criminal defendants.150  
The majority did, however, suggest a standard that “certainly would . . . 
satisf[y] due process.”151  Citing its Harper decision,152 the majority stated 
that due process would be satisfied if the trial court finds that the 
compelled treatment is “medically appropriate and, considering less 
intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [the defendant’s] own 
safety or the safety of others.”153  Additionally, the majority opined that 
due process “might” be satisfied if the compelled treatment is medically 
appropriate and an adjudication of guilt or innocence cannot be obtained 
using less intrusive means.154  Although the Court acknowledged that 
this gratuitous comment involved speculation on a question that was not 
before the Court for decision,155 other courts, quoting that comment,156 
cite Riggins as authority supporting the involuntary medication of 
incompetent criminal defendants to achieve the state’s interest in 
restoring their trial competence.157  The Supreme Court has recently 
agreed to consider whether involuntarily medicating an incompetent 
defendant to restore competency to stand trial for nonviolent offenses 
violates the defendant’s constitutional rights.158 
 
 148. Id. at 137–38. 
 149. Id. at 132–38. 
 150. Id. at 136.  The Court specifically noted that it had “not had occasion to 
develop substantive standards for judging forced administration of [antipsychotic] drugs 
in the trial or pretrial settings.”  Id. at 135.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas 
asserted that the Riggins majority “appears to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny.”  Id. at 
156 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  The majority denied the assertion.  Id. at 136. 
 151. Id. at 135. 
 152. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); see supra notes 84–94 and 
accompanying text. 
 153. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 136.  Because Riggins did not claim a right to discontinue psychotropic 
medication if its administration was necessary to continue his competence to stand trial, 
the Court specifically refused to consider whether Riggins, or any competent criminal 
defendant, had such a right.  Id.  Justice Kennedy, author of the majority’s Harper 
decision, wrote a concurring opinion in Riggins expressing doubt that the state’s interest 
in conducting a trial allows it to involuntarily medicate a defendant to assure his  
competence to stand trial.  Id. at 138–45 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
 156. United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Sell, 
282 F.3d 560, 566 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 512 (2002); United States v. 
Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001). 
 157. See supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. 
 158. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 512.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the limited 
purpose of considering the following question: “Whether the Court of Appeals erred in 
rejecting petitioner’s argument that allowing the government to administer anti-psychotic 
MORRIS.DOC 1/14/2020  2:30 PM 
[VOL. 40:  481, 2003]  Escaping the Asylum 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 509 
Even if temporarily incompetent criminal defendants do not have a 
right to refuse psychotropic medication and thus can be distinguished 
from civilly committed patients who have such right, can they be 
distinguished from civilly committed patients for other purposes, 
including prosecution for the crime of escape?  If danger to society is the 
justification for criminal prosecution, the patient who was civilly 
committed as dangerous to society and who was not medicated over his 
objection because the patient was competent to refuse medication 
presents a greater danger through escape than does an involuntarily 
medicated criminal defendant.  The defendant was confined because he 
was incompetent to stand trial, not because he was too dangerous to live 
in society. 
I previously argued that the state’s interest in resuming a mentally ill 
convict’s punishment once his mental condition improves does not 
justify criminalizing his escape prior to such improvement.159  Similarly, 
the state’s interest in trying an incompetent criminal defendant once the 
defendant has been restored to competency does not justify criminalizing 
his escape prior to such restoration.  Both have been hospitalized for 
treatment of their mental condition, not for punishment.  Their status, 
while in that hospital, is patient, not prisoner. 
In fact, incompetent defendants have a stronger argument against 
prosecution for escape than do mentally ill convicts.  Although convicts 
face the certainty of punishment when their mental condition improves, 
criminal defendants face only the prospect of criminal trial upon 
restoration to competency.  Punishment for criminal defendants is 
appropriate only if they are found guilty in those trials.  If civilly 
committed patients are not prosecuted for the crime of escape, 
incompetent criminal defendants—individuals whom the law presumes 
to be innocent until they are proven guilty—should not be prosecuted for 
the crime of escape.  Although mentally incompetent criminal defendants 
can be detained to restore their competence and although they face a 
criminal trial if their competence is restored, they do not become 
convicts unless and until they are convicted.  Unless and until that event 
occurs, they should be considered to be civil patients, not convict patients. 
 
medication against his will solely to render him competent to stand trial for non-violent 
offenses would violate his right under the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.”  Id.   
 159. See supra text following note 98. 
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2.  Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants 
Prior to 1972, criminal defendants found mentally incompetent to 
stand trial were confined for an indeterminate period until their 
competence was restored.160  For many, “a finding of incompetence to 
stand trial was tantamount to a life sentence.”161  In Jackson v. 
Indiana,162 however, a unanimous163 Supreme Court invalidated a statute 
that permitted the indeterminate—and potentially lifetime—commitment 
of a mentally retarded, deaf mute person who had been found 
incompetent to stand trial.164  The Court ruled that the Baxstrom 
principle is not limited to sentence-expiring convicts, but applies as well 
to incompetent criminal defendants: “If criminal conviction and imposition 
of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive 
protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to 
all others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice.”165  
Equal protection is denied when incompetent criminal defendants are 
subjected to a more lenient commitment standard (that is, incompetence 
to stand criminal trial) and to a more stringent release standard (that is, 
restoration of trial competence) than is applicable to all other persons 
who are not charged with crimes and who could only be detained under 
the state’s civil commitment laws.166  Although the finding of incompetence 
to stand trial may justify a brief period of detention designed to restore 
the defendant’s competence, due process requires that incompetent 
defendants who cannot soon be restored to competency must be released 
or subjected to “the customary civil commitment proceeding that would 
be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen.”167  Although the 
Court declined to specify when civil commitment or release must occur, 
 
 160. A 1965 study of Matteawan State Hospital, a maximum security institution 
administered by the New York State Department of Correction, revealed that 208 of the 
1062 mentally incompetent defendants at that facility had been detained there for twenty 
years or more.  SPECIAL COMM. ON THE STUDY OF COMMITMENT PROCEDURES & THE LAW 
RELATING TO INCOMPETENTS, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., MENTAL ILLNESS, 
DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 72–73 (1968).  The patient longest in 
residence at Matteawan at that time was an eighty-three year old patient who had been 
accused of burglary in 1901 and who had been found mentally incompetent to stand trial.  
Id. at 72.  After sixty-four years of confinement at Matteawan, he was, at least theoretically, 
still awaiting restoration to competence so that he could undergo a criminal trial. 
 161. Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind?  Out of Sight: The Uncivil 
Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1, 4 (1993). 
 162. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
 163. Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the Court’s 
consideration of, or decision in, the case.  Id. at 741. 
 164. Id. at 717–19, 738. 
 165. Id. at 724. 
 166. See id. at 730. 
 167. Id. at 738. 
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the Court noted that detention of incompetent defendants is appropriate 
only for those who “probably soon will be able to stand trial.”168  And 
even for those defendants, the Court required that commitment “must be 
justified by progress toward that goal.”169 
If permanently incompetent criminal defendants cannot be distinguished 
from others who are subjected to involuntary civil commitment—if they 
cannot be separately categorized for civil commitment purposes—then 
they cannot be distinguished from other civilly committed patients when 
they escape from the mental hospital.  They are civil patients.  If other 
civilly committed patients are not prosecuted for the crime of escape, 
then equal protection insulates incompetent criminal defendant patients 
from such prosecution. 
In applying these principles, a New York appellate court ruled that the 
state’s escape statute, which penalizes escape from a detention facility 
by a person who has been charged with a felony,170 was not applicable to 
a permanently incompetent criminal defendant who was civilly 
committed to a mental hospital.171  Under the escape statute, a “detention 
facility” is defined as “any place used for the confinement, pursuant to 
an order of a court, of a person . . . confined pursuant to an order of a 
court.”172  Civil mental patients, however, are not involuntarily committed 
initially by a court order, but rather upon the certificates of two 
examining physicians accompanied by an appropriate application.173  
Citing “the equal protection mandate of Jackson v. Indiana,”174 the court 
noted that a permanently incompetent defendant is admitted “on the 
 
 168. Id.  An incompetent defendant can only be held for “the reasonable period of 
time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that 
capacity in the foreseeable future.”  Id.  If such probability does not exist, the defendant 
must be released or civilly committed.  If such probability does exist, the defendant may be 
detained for a limited time to attempt to restore his competency.  Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.15 (McKinney 1999). 
 171. See People ex rel. Powell v. Warden, Kings County Hosp., 422 N.Y.S.2d 726, 
728–29 (App. Div. 1979). 
 172. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.00 (McKinney 1999); see Powell, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 728. 
 173. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(a) (McKinney 2002); see Powell, 422 
N.Y.S.2d at 728–29.  The statute provides: “The director of a hospital may receive and 
retain therein as a patient any person alleged to be mentally ill and in need of involuntary 
care and treatment upon the certificates of two examining physicians, accompanied by an 
application for the admission of such person.”  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(a).  A 
person may be detained for sixty days before judicial approval is required to extend the 
commitment.  See id. § 9.33; Powell, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 729. 
 174. Powell, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 728. 
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same basis provided for any other person, without regard to his status as 
an accused.”175  Because there was no court order authorizing confinement 
of the permanently incompetent criminal defendant at the time he 
escaped, he did not violate the escape statute.176 
Although Jackson was decided more than thirty years ago, it too joins 
Baxstrom, not just as a viable precedent, but as a venerable precedent.  
Jackson has been cited in over 600 court decisions, including twenty-
four Supreme Court decisions.177  Nevertheless, a review of legislation 
in the fifty states and the District of Columbia, conducted twenty years 
after Jackson v. Indiana was decided, revealed that the Supreme Court’s 
decision has been ignored or circumvented in a majority of jurisdictions.178  
Some states ignore Jackson by continuing to allow incompetent 
defendants to be detained until their competence has been restored.179  
Others evade Jackson by imposing a lengthy period of treatment before 
acknowledging that the defendant is permanently incompetent, that is, 
that there is no substantial probability that the defendant will become 
competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future.180  Although this 
decision can be made within six months or, at most, a year,181  Florida, for 
example, mandates a five-year treatment period for any incompetent 
felony defendant.182  Several states tie the maximum length of the 
treatment period to the maximum sentence that could have been imposed 
if the defendant was convicted of the crime charged.183 
These laws do not conform to the Supreme Court’s requirement that 
conditions an incompetent defendant’s treatment on progress toward the 
goal of restoration to competence.184  A defendant charged with a serious 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 727–29. 
 177. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (WL KeyCite performed Mar. 22, 
2003).  The Supreme Court most recently cited Jackson in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678 (2001), noting that when “detention’s goal is no longer practically attainable, 
detention no longer ‘bear[s] [a] reasonable relation to the purpose for which the 
individual [was] committed.’”  Id. at 690 (quoting Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738). 
 178. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 161, at 13–33. 
 179. Id. at 13. 
 180. Id. at 15–18. 
 181. See RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 
116–20 (1980).  Roesch and Golding discuss twelve proposals to establish durational 
limits on the treatment of incompetent defendants.  Most of the proposals recommended 
a six-month limitation with a possible six-month extension if a substantial probability exists 
that competence will be restored within that extension.  Id. at 116.  Among those who 
propose such limits is distinguished psychiatrist Alan Stone, M.D., a former President of 
the American Psychiatric Association and Professor of Law and Psychiatry at Harvard.  
ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 212–13 (1976). 
 182. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.213(a)–(b). 
 183. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 161, at 17–18. 
 184. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); see supra notes 168–69 and 
accompanying text.  See generally 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: 
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crime is not by that fact alone more difficult to treat or less responsive to 
treatment than a defendant charged with a less serious crime.185  
Treatment progress simply cannot be measured by the seriousness of the 
criminal charge or the possible sentence that could be imposed if the 
defendant were found guilty in a trial that has yet to be held.  And yet, 
these laws allow continued confinement of permanently incompetent 
criminal defendants even though further treatment will not result in 
restoration of their competency.  “At the least,” stated the Court in 
Jackson, “due process requires that the nature and duration of 
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the 
individual is committed.”186  That purpose is restoration to competence, 
not incapacitation for the length of a maximum sentence that can only be 
imposed if the defendant is tried and found guilty.187 
In California, permanently incompetent criminal defendants can be 
placed on mental health conservatorships using different criteria than are 
used to establish mental health conservatorships for all other mentally ill 
people.  To establish a mental health conservatorship, the individual 
must be gravely disabled.188  For all other mentally ill people, “gravely 
disabled” is defined as “a condition in which a person as a result of a 
mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs 
for food, clothing, or shelter.”189  However, for permanently incompetent 
criminal defendants, “gravely disabled” is defined as a condition in 
which the person has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial; the 
indictment or information charges a felony involving death, great bodily 
injury, or a serious threat to the physical well-being of another; the 
indictment or information has not been dismissed; and the person is 
 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 8A-5.3, at 70–73 (2d ed. 2002) (characterizing as “pretextuality” 
the decisions of state courts and legislatures to avoid their Jackson obligations). 
 185. See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 181, at 127. 
 186. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. 
 187. In Minnesota, upon a finding of incompetency to stand trial, the defendant is not 
committed for the limited purpose of restoring his competency.  Upon a finding of 
incompetence, commitment occurs, if at all, only through the civil commitment process.  
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01(4).  However, if the incompetent defendant is found to have 
homicidal tendencies, the law requires that the defendant be committed “to the 
Minnesota Security Hospital for safekeeping and treatment . . . until recovery.”  MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 253.25 (West 1998).  Thus, for these defendants, indeterminate commitment 
occurs without any requirement of treatment progress to restore competency.  For these 
defendants, Minnesota violates Jackson’s requirements. 
 188. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350 (West 1998). 
 189. Id. § 5008(h)(1)(A). 
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incompetent to stand trial.190  Thus, for permanently incompetent criminal 
defendants, grave disability is not determined by a functional inability to 
provide for basic needs.  Nevertheless, as with other gravely disabled 
persons placed on conservatorships, permanently incompetent defendant 
conservatees may be subjected to inpatient commitment at the direction 
of their conservators.191  However, unlike other conservatees who, by 
law, must be placed in the least restrictive placement,192 permanently 
incompetent criminal defendant conservatees, by law, must be placed in 
a facility “that achieves the purposes of treatment of the conservatee and 
protection of the public.”193  Other conservatees, if committed at all, are 
typically placed in community mental treatment facilities; permanently 
incompetent defendant conservatees are often committed to more 
secure—and more isolated—state hospitals.194  Other conservatees may be 
transferred by their conservators to alternative placements without any 
hearing or court approval.195  Permanently incompetent criminal defendant 
conservatees may not be transferred by their conservators to alternative 
placements unless written notice of the proposed change of placement is 
provided to the court and to others designated by the statute and by the 
court to receive notice.  If any person receiving such notice objects to the 
proposed transfer, transfer may not occur without a hearing and court 
approval.196  Court approval may only be given if the conservator proves 
by a preponderance of the evidence that a less restrictive alternative 
placement does not pose a threat to the safety of the public, the 
permanently incompetent criminal defendant, or to any other 
individual.197 
Surely, the California approach violates the Jackson requirements.198  
 
 190. Id. § 5008(h)(1)(B). 
 191. Id. § 5358(a)(1)–(2). 
 192. Id. § 5358(a)(1)(A). 
 193. Id. § 5358(a)(1)(B). 
 194. On November 6, 2002, thirty-three permanently incompetent criminal defendant 
conservatees were confined in Patton State Hospital, thirty in Napa State Hospital, and 
four in Metropolitan State Hospital.  E-mail from Barrie Hafler, Public Relations Officer, 
Atascadero State Hospital, to Grant Morris, Professor of Law, University of San Diego 
School of Law (Nov. 7, 2002, 10:58:03 PST) (on file with author). 
 195. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(d)(1) (West 1998). 
 196. Id. § 5358(d)(2). 
 197. Id. § 5358(d)(3).  A hearing to consider transfer to a less restrictive alternative 
placement may not be granted more than once every six months.  Id. § 5358(d)(4) 
(incorporating by reference id. § 5358.3). 
 198. The failure to accord permanently incompetent defendant conservatees the 
same right to placement in the least restrictive appropriate treatment setting may also 
violate the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  See Michael L. Perlin, 
“For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of 
Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 232–34 (2000) 
(asserting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), 
interpreting the ADA, may require individualized placement decisionmaking for 
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Jackson specifically prohibits use of a more lenient commitment 
standard and a more stringent release standard for permanently 
incompetent criminal defendants than for other persons not charged with 
crimes.199  However, California violates this prohibition.  If a defendant 
is permanently incompetent, Jackson obligates the state either to 
“institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be 
required to commit indefinitely any other citizen or release the 
defendant.”200  California fails to meet this obligation.201 
In states that ignore or evade their Jackson obligation by continuing to 
detain permanently incompetent defendants as if they were only 
temporarily incompetent,202 a defendant is more likely to be subjected to a 
criminal prosecution for escape than in states that have properly applied 
Jackson by acknowledging the indeterminacy of the defendant’s condition 
and then civilly committing him.  The nonconforming states have not 
conceded that the permanently incompetent defendant is a civil patient and 
that he must be treated in all respects as a civil patient.  These states 
continue to deny that equal protection precludes prosecuting these patients 
for the crime of escape if other civilly committed patients are not 
prosecuted for that crime. 
To assure that incompetent criminal defendants—including permanently 
 
permanently incompetent criminal defendants and other forensic patients, rather than 
uniform placement in maximum security institutions). 
 199. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730 (1972); see also supra notes 166–67 
and accompanying text. 
 200. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 (emphasis added). 
 201. But see Conservatorship of Hofferber, 616 P.2d 836 (Cal. 1980).  In Hofferber, 
the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of California’s special 
conservatorship statute for permanently incompetent criminal defendants, but engrafted 
on the statute a requirement that the trial court find that the incompetent defendant, by 
reason of mental disorder, represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others.  Id. 
at 846–47.  The court asserted that the state “may adopt more than one procedure for 
isolating, treating, and restraining dangerous persons.”  Id. at 844.  According to the 
court, the legislature may establish a short-term civil commitment process for an 
imminently dangerous person who has not been adjudicated under the criminal justice 
system and may also establish a separate, longer-term civil commitment process for a 
permanently incompetent criminal defendant.  Id. at 844–46. 
Chief Justice Bird dissented, angrily denouncing the court’s decision: “It is with 
considerable bewilderment that one reads today’s majority opinion.  Explicit words—not 
to mention fundamental premises—of a United States Supreme Court decision are 
ignored, as if they do not exist.  Firmly established methods of equal protection analysis 
are fleetingly alluded to and then forgotten.”  Id. at 852 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).  For a 
more extensive critique of the Hofferber decision, see Morris & Meloy, supra note 161, 
at 27–32. 
 202. See supra notes 178–83 and accompanying text. 
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incompetent criminal defendants—are prosecuted for escape, some state 
legislatures have not been content to rely upon the general statutory 
provisions that criminalize escape from custody.  Rather, in these states 
statutes have been enacted specifically targeting escape by hospitalized 
incompetent criminal defendants.  A Florida statute, for example, declares 
the legislature’s intent to establish within the Department of Children 
and Family Services separate and secure facilities for incompetent 
criminal defendants who are committed to the Department while under 
the jurisdiction of the committing court.203  Another Florida statute 
declares: “A defendant involuntarily committed to the department under 
the provisions of this chapter who escapes or attempts to escape from a 
facility . . . commits a felony . . . .”204  This specialized escape statute 
appears to apply, not only to temporarily incompetent defendants, but to 
permanently incompetent defendants as well.  The trial court, upon 
finding that a defendant is permanently incompetent, may order the 
defendant committed to the Department of Children and Family Services 
for involuntary hospitalization.205 
In California, a statute declares that every mentally incompetent 
defendant who escapes after being committed to a state hospital or other 
mental health facility is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail or 
in the state prison.206  The statute appears to apply not only to temporarily 
incompetent defendants, but to permanently incompetent defendants as 
well.  The statute specifically refers to other statutes207 that authorize a 
mental health conservatorship to be established for a permanently 
incompetent defendant208 and authorize the conservator to place the 
conservatee in a state hospital.209 
Specialized escape statutes targeting incompetent criminal defendants—
especially permanently incompetent criminal defendants—betray Jackson’s 
 
 203. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.105(1) (West 2001).  The Florida Legislature also 
expresses its intent to confine within those secure facilities defendants who have been 
acquitted of felonies by reason of insanity.  Id.  The Florida Legislature declares that 
“[s]uch secure facilities shall be designed and administered so that ingress and egress . . . 
may be strictly controlled by staff responsible for security in order to protect the 
defendant, facility personnel, other clients, and citizens in adjacent communities.”  Id. 
 204. Id. § 916.1081. 
 205. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.213(b). 
 206. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370.5(a) (West 2000). 
 207. Id. (referring to criminal defendants who have been committed to a state hospital 
or other mental health facility pursuant to California Penal Code sections 1370 or 1370.01). 
 208. Id. § 1370(c)(1)–(2) (West Supp. 2003); id. § 1370.01(c)(1)–(2) (West 2000). 
 209. Sections 1370(c)(2) and 1370.01(c)(2) each authorize the initiation of 
conservatorship proceedings pursuant to Chapter 3 of Part 1 of Division 5 of California’s 
Welfare and Institutions Code, commencing with section 5350.  Id. §§ 1370(c)(2), 
1370.01(c)(2).  Section 5358 of California’s Welfare and Institutions Code authorizes the 
conservator to place the conservatee in a state hospital.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 
5358(a)(2) (West 1998). 
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promise that such individuals are not distinguishable from other civilly 
committed individuals.  Because other civilly committed patients cannot be 
prosecuted for escape under these statutes, equal protection prohibits use of 
such statutes to prosecute permanently incompetent criminal defendants. 
C.  Insanity Acquittees 
If sentence-expiring convicts and permanently incompetent criminal 
defendants cannot be specially classified for civil commitment purposes 
and cannot be prosecuted for escape when other civilly committed patients 
are not, then it is logical to assume that no nonconvict can be specially 
classified for those purposes, even a nonconvict who has been involved in 
the criminal process.  In Jackson, the Supreme Court noted that the 
Baxstrom principle had been extended to post-trial commitment decisions 
involving individuals who had been absolved from criminal responsibility 
by insanity verdicts.210  A successful insanity defense precludes criminal 
responsibility.  A seriously mentally disordered person who engages in 
criminal behavior but who is found not guilty of the crime because of 
that disorder is not blameworthy and is not subject to criminal 
punishment.  Relying upon Baxstrom, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit211 and the highest appellate courts in several 
states212 held that an insanity verdict could not by itself justify the 
indeterminate detention of an insanity acquittee.  Although a finding of 
insanity at the time of the criminal act warrants a post-trial evaluation of 
the acquittee’s current mental condition, once that evaluation is 
 
 210. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724 (1972). 
 211. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1968).  Chief Judge Bazelon, 
writing for the court, relied on Baxstrom as establishing the principle that “the 
commission of criminal acts does not give rise to a presumption of dangerousness which, 
standing alone, justifies substantial difference in commitment procedures and 
confinement conditions for the mentally ill.”  Id. at 647.  To confine an insanity acquittee 
without affording him the standard civil commitment procedural protections denies him 
equal protection.  See id. at 651–52.  The court rejected the argument, which the 
Supreme Court also rejected in Baxstrom, that expeditious commitment of nonconvict 
mentally ill persons is justified because of their dangerous or criminal propensities.  See 
id. at 649.  Bolton has been superceded by statute, as stated in United States v. Cohen, 
733 F.2d 128, 130–31 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  See infra note 215 (discussing the District of 
Columbia statute that superceded Bolton). 
 212. See, e.g., State v. Clemons, 515 P.2d 324, 328–29 (Ariz. 1973); Wilson v. 
State, 287 N.E.2d 875, 881 (Ind. 1972); People v. McQuillan, 221 N.W.2d 569, 579–80, 
586 (Mich. 1974); People v. Lally, 224 N.E.2d 87, 92 (N.Y. 1966); State v. Krol, 344 
A.2d 289, 297–99 (N.J. 1975); State ex rel. Kovach v. Schubert, 219 N.W.2d 341, 346–47 
(Wis. 1974), overruled by State v. Field, 347 N.W.2d 365, 366–67, 372 (Wis. 1984).  
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completed, the acquittee should not be distinguished from other 
nonconvict mentally disordered persons in the criteria applied to the 
commitment decision and the procedures employed in the commitment 
process.213 
Nevertheless, in Jones v. United States,214 a narrowly divided Supreme 
Court held that “insanity acquittees constitute a special class that [can] 
be treated differently from other candidates for commitment.”215  As a 
special class, insanity acquittees can be subjected to automatic, 
indeterminate commitment without first undergoing the civil commitment 
process.216  For civil commitment generally, the state is required to 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person is both mentally 
ill and dangerous.217  According to the five-judge Jones majority, the 
state has no such burden for insanity acquittee commitment.  In his 
criminal trial, Jones pleaded insanity as a defense to the crime charged 
against him.218  The insanity verdict established that he committed a 
criminal act and that he did so because of mental illness.219  The 
legislature may determine that the insanity verdict supports an inference 
of continuing mental illness220 and continuing dangerousness.221  Thus, 
insanity acquittees can be distinguished from others, such as 
incompetent criminal defendants, about whom such proof is lacking.222 
 
 213. See generally Grant H. Morris, Dealing Responsibly with the Criminally 
Irresponsible, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 855 (asserting that although insanity acquittees can be 
subjected to a post-trial evaluation to assess their current mental condition, they should 
not be distinguished from other nonconvict mentally disordered persons in commitment, 
release, and treatment decisions). 
 214. 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
 215. Id. at 370. 
 216. Id.  The District of Columbia statute interpreted in the Jones case provided, 
and continues to provide, that within fifty days of commitment, a judicial hearing shall 
be held at which the insanity acquittee can prove his eligibility for release.  D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 24-501(d)(2)(A) (2001) (formerly cited as § 24-301(d)(2)(A)).  At that hearing, 
the burden is placed on the insanity acquittee to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he “has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be 
dangerous to himself or others.”  Id. § 24-501(d)(1), (d)(2)(B), (e). 
 217. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979). 
 218. Jones, 463 U.S. at 360. 
 219. See id. at 363. 
 220. See id. at 366. 
 221. See id. at 364.  The Jones majority reasoned that proof of the commission of a 
criminal act is “concrete evidence” that “may be at least as persuasive as any predictions 
about dangerousness that might be made in a civil-commitment proceeding.”  Id. 
 222. The Court distinguished insanity acquittees from criminal defendants found 
incompetent to stand trial.  Incompetent criminal defendants cannot be committed 
indefinitely because no affirmative proof has been offered that they committed criminal 
acts or were dangerous.  Id. at 364 n.12 (discussing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 
(1972)). 
Some states have enacted statutes that provide for an evidentiary hearing on the 
question of a permanently incompetent defendant’s guilt of the crime charged.  If, at that 
hearing, the defendant is found to have committed a crime, the defendant is subjected to 
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In his dissenting opinion,223 Justice Brennan noted that an insanity 
trial focuses on the defendant’s mental condition in the past, at the time 
of the alleged criminal act.  It does not provide an adequate basis from 
which to infer the present and future mental condition of the insanity 
acquittee.224  Insanity acquittees are similarly situated with sentence-
expiring convicts who may “not be treated differently from other 
candidates for civil commitment.”225  Just as the state bears the burden of 
proving that sentence-expiring convicts and others subjected to the civil 
commitment process are currently mentally ill and dangerous, the state 
should be obligated to prove the same for insanity acquittees.  Justice 
Brennan asserted that the Jones majority did not “purport to overrule 
Baxstrom or any of the cases which have followed Baxstrom.  It is clear, 
therefore, that the separate facts of criminality and mental illness cannot 
support indefinite psychiatric commitment, for both were present in 
Baxstrom.”226 
 
additional treatment without undergoing the civil commitment process.  See, e.g., 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-25 (West Supp. 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1.5 
(Michie 2000).  Some might assert that, consistent with Jones, the determination of 
factual guilt in the evidentiary hearing justifies the extended commitment of permanently 
incompetent criminal defendants.  Such statutes, however, do not conform to the requirements 
of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).  In Jackson, the Supreme Court declared 
that the purpose of committing an incompetent is to determine whether the individual 
will be restored to competency in the near future and if so, to treat the individual toward 
that end.  Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.  No other purpose was identified by the Court in 
Jackson, and no other purpose has been identified by the Court since it decided Jackson.  
Because a factual finding of guilt is not related to progress in treatment to restore 
competence, a factual guilt hearing cannot justify an extended period of treatment.  Even 
if the factual guilt finding could justify placement of incompetent defendants into a 
special class for commitment purposes initially, the special commitment must end when 
the justification for that commitment ends.  If the incompetent defendant has not 
progressed toward restoration of competence, the defendant can no longer be committed 
as an incompetent defendant.  Subsequent commitment of the permanently incompetent 
defendant, if it is to occur at all, must be achieved through the customary civil 
commitment process used to commit any other citizen.  Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738; see 
Morris & Meloy, supra note 161, at 18–23 (critiquing the use of evidentiary hearings to 
establish guilt of permanently incompetent criminal defendants so that they may be 
detained without customary civil commitment proceedings). 
 223. Jones, 463 U.S. at 371–86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun joined in Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion.  Id. at 371.  Justice Stevens 
wrote a separate dissent.  Id. at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 224. Id. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 225. Id. at 376 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 226. Id. at 380.  In Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), the Court held that due 
process precludes the continued detention of a dangerous, but not mentally ill, insanity 
acquittee.  Id. at 83.  Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion, also addressed the 
equal protection issue in a portion of the opinion in which three other justices joined.  
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American courts have not uniformly decided cases involving the 
applicability of criminal escape statutes to insanity acquittees.  In fact, 
one justice asserted that “there exists a distinct polarization of views on 
the issue.”227  Some courts have ruled that insanity acquittee escape is 
not a crime.  For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit has repeatedly held that the Federal Escape Act 
requirement that the escape, in order to be unlawful, must be from 
custody or confinement “by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or 
conviction of any offense”228 was not satisfied in cases involving 
insanity acquittees escaping from St. Elizabeths Hospital.229  The verdict 
acquitting the defendant by reason of insanity terminates the legal 
vitality of the arrest and does not constitute a criminal conviction.230  
The court noted that any doubt about its construction of the escape 
statute is dispelled by the existence of another District of Columbia 
statute that requires the committing court, upon request of the 
government, to order the return of the escaped patient to the hospital.231 
A unanimous Connecticut Supreme Court held that a statute 
specifically criminalizing escape “from a correctional institution, any 
public or private, nonprofit half-way house, group home or mental health 
facility” did not apply to an insanity acquittee who escaped from a 
locked ward of a mental hospital.232  A literal construction of the statute, 
said the court, would produce the bizarre result that a person who 
voluntarily admitted himself to a mental hospital would be guilty of a 
felony if he left that facility without permission.233  Therefore, the court 
 
Justice White embraced and applied Justice Brennan’s equal protection analysis in Jones.  
Because the state did not provide for continuing confinement of sentence-expiring 
convicts who may be dangerous when their sentences expire, it may not continue the 
confinement of insanity acquittees who may be dangerous but who are no longer insane.  
Id. at 85.  The state lacked a particularly convincing reason for discriminating against 
insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill.  Id. at 86.  They are similarly situated 
with sentence-expiring convicts.  Id. at 85.  If sentence-expiring convicts cannot be 
separately categorized for civil commitment purposes, insanity acquittees who are no 
longer mentally ill cannot be so categorized. 
 227. People v. Ortega, 487 N.Y.S.2d 939, 945 (Sup. Ct. 1985), aff’d, 499 N.Y.S.2d 
1018 (App. Div. 1986), appeal granted, 497 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 505 N.E.2d 
613 (N.Y. 1987). 
 228. 18 U.S.C. § 751 (2000). 
 229. United States v. Powell, 503 F.2d 195, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see United States v. 
Wood, 628 F.2d 554, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (applying Powell); see also United States v. 
Snyder, 529 F.2d 871, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting that the government concedes that 
Powell requires reversal of the escape conviction). 
 230. Powell, 503 F.2d at 196. 
 231. Id. (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(i) (now codified as D.C. CODE ANN. § 
24-501(i) (2001))). 
 232. State v. Delafose, 441 A.2d 158, 159, 161–63 (Conn. 1981) (quoting CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-169). 
 233. Id. at 161. 
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examined the legislature’s intent in amending the escape statute to 
include half-way houses, group homes, and mental health facilities as 
places from which escape is punishable.  That purpose was “to impose 
the same liability for a prisoner’s escape from the designated facilities as 
for the prisoner’s escape from the correctional institution from which he 
had been transferred.”234  Thus, the statute did not apply to an insanity 
acquittee because he was not a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the 
Commissioner of Corrections at the time he escaped.235 
A New York Supreme Court held that an insanity acquittee’s 
unauthorized departure from a nonsecure mental health facility was not 
an escape from a “detention facility” as required for criminal liability 
under the state’s felony or misdemeanor escape statutes.236  Although the 
statutory definition of “detention facility” is not limited to a prison but 
includes any place used to confine a person pursuant to a court order,237 
the court construed that language to refer to a civil jail used to confine 
persons in pending civil actions, not to a mental hospital used to confine 
insanity acquittees and other civilly committed mental patients.238  
Because the New York Legislature had enacted a separate statute to 
assure apprehension and return of escaped insanity acquittees but had 
not specifically imposed criminal penalties on those patients for their 
escape, the court deemed it inappropriate to impose such sanctions 
through an expansive interpretation of the more generalized and 
ambiguous language contained in the existing escape statutes.239  
Although the court’s analysis would preclude inclusion of any mental 
health facility within the definition of “detention facility,” the court 
bolstered its decision by distinguishing nonsecure facilities, from which 
the individual in this case escaped, from secure facilities.240  Insanity 
 
 234. Id. at 161–62. 
 235. Id. at 162. 
 236. People v. Ortega, 487 N.Y.S.2d 939, 948–49, 951–52 (Sup. Ct. 1985), aff’d, 
499 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. Div. 1986), appeal granted, 497 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. 1988), 
aff’d, 505 N.E.2d 613 (N.Y. 1987). 
 237. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.00 (McKinney 1999). 
 238. Ortega, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 947 (construing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.00(1)).  The 
court expressed concern that a literal reading of the statute would allow a criminal 
prosecution of civilly committed elderly parents or developmentally disabled children 
who left the mental health facility without authorization.  See id. at 946. 
 239. Id. at 950–52 (discussing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(19)). 
 240. Id. at 947–48.  The court made this distinction in the event that the legislature 
“by some strained interpretation” intended to include at least some mental health 
facilities within the term “detention facility.”  Id. at 947. 
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acquittees placed in nonsecure facilities do not suffer from a dangerous 
disorder.241  In nonsecure facilities, no premium is placed on security 
and confinement.242  “It would be anomalous,” said the court, “to apply 
penal sanctions to a departure from a facility which has, as its primary 
goal, therapeutic treatment as opposed to confinement.”243 
However, some courts have ruled that insanity acquittee escape is a 
crime.  For example, less than one year after the New York Supreme 
Court decision discussed above, the appellate division of that court held 
that a secure mental health facility qualifies as a “detention facility” for 
the purpose of prosecuting escapes by insanity acquittees.244 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that an insanity acquittee 
who fails to return from a mental health facility furlough commits the 
crime of escape under a statute that proscribed escape by anyone who 
was “lawfully detained in any jail or other place of confinement.”245  The 
court reasoned that the legislation focused on the lawfulness of the 
detention, not the reason for the detention.  Thus, the statute applied to 
detentions that were either criminal or civil in nature.246  Escape by an 
insanity acquittee “is an evil to be avoided, not merely because of the 
threat of violence but also because the judicially sanctioned control of 
 
 241. See id. at 948.  The New York statutes establish a comprehensive “three-track” 
procedure for post-verdict disposition of insanity acquittees.  If the court finds that the 
acquittee has a dangerous mental disorder, the acquittee is committed to a secure facility.  
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(1)(f), (6) (McKinney 1994).  If the court finds that the 
acquittee does not have a dangerous mental disorder but is mentally ill, the acquittee is 
civilly committed.  Id. § 330.20(6)–(7).  If the court finds that the acquittee does not have 
a dangerous mental disorder and is not mentally ill, the acquittee is discharged.  Id. § 
330.20(7). 
 242. Ortega, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 948.  In contrast, a “secure facility” is defined as one 
that is “staffed with personnel adequately trained in security methods and so equipped as 
to minimize the risk or danger of escapes.”  Id. (citing 14 N.Y COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 14, § 541.1(z)). 
 243. Id. at 948. 
 244. People v. Walter, 499 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (App. Div. 1986).  Although the 
court discussed Ortega, it did not decide whether a nonsecure facility also qualifies as a 
“detention facility.”  Id.  The Walter court relied upon its earlier decision in People v. 
Buthy, 446 N.Y.S.2d 756 (App. Div. 1981) (holding that the escape statute applies to an 
insanity acquittee who escaped from the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, 
who is a public servant under whose restraint the acquittee was placed by court order).  
Walter, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 282.  At the time of the Buthy decision, however, no separate 
statutory provision existed to assure apprehension and return of escaped insanity acquittees 
without specifically imposing criminal penalties on them.  See id.  The Walter court also 
relied upon People ex rel. Powell v. Warden, Kings County Hosp., 422 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. 
Div. 1979) (holding that the escape statute does not apply to a permanently incompetent 
criminal defendant who was civilly committed to a mental health facility pursuant to the 
discretionary action of the hospital director rather than pursuant to a court order).  Walter, 
446 N.Y.S.2d at 282–83; see supra notes 170–76 and accompanying text (discussing Powell). 
 245. State v. Flemming, 377 A.2d 448, 450–51 (Me. 1977) (interpreting former ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1405, repealed by P.L. 1975, ch. 499, § 7 (1976)). 
 246. Id. at 450. 
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such person is frustrated thereby.”247  Additionally, the statute did not 
require that the escape be from a penal institution.  A mental health 
facility qualified as an “other place of confinement.”248 
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine wrote a 
separate opinion expressing his disagreement with the court’s 
decision.249  He asserted that the legislature, by eliminating the existing 
statutory requirement that the person be lawfully detained “for any 
criminal offense,” was merely responding to a decision of the court one 
year earlier that refused to apply the escape statute to a person charged 
with, but not yet convicted of, a crime.250  The legislature intended to 
apply the escape law to individuals detained on criminal charges, not to 
insanity acquittees who are neither charged with nor convicted of crimes.251 
Some courts have considered broader issues than the statutory 
construction question of whether insanity acquittees are included as 
appropriate candidates for escape crime prosecution.  For example, even 
prior to the Jones decision, the supreme courts of Missouri252 and 
Colorado253 held that equal protection of the laws is not violated by a 
statute that criminalizes escape by insanity acquittees but not escape by 
civilly committed patients.  According to the Missouri Supreme Court, 
to preserve public safety, the state may reasonably distinguish between 
insanity acquittees, whom the court characterized as “persons having . . . 
dangerous characteristics or proclivities,”254 and civilly committed 
 
 247. Id. at 451. 
 248. Id.  Eleven years later, the court, relying on its Flemming decision, held that an 
insanity acquittee’s unauthorized departure from a mental health facility constitutes 
escape from “official custody” in violation of Maine’s revised escape statute.  State v. 
Beauchene, 541 A.2d 914, 916–17 (Me. 1988) (construing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 
§ 755). 
 249. Flemming, 377 A.2d at 451–58 (Dufresne, C.J., concurring).  Although the 
Chief Justice expressly stated that he disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that an 
insanity acquittee’s escape is within the scope of the escape statute, he nevertheless 
concurred with the majority’s judgment that the trial court erred in dismissing the 
indictment.  Id. at 452.  That indictment charged the defendant with the common law 
crime of escape, an offense punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or by 
imprisonment of less than one year.  Id. at 457–58. 
 250. Id. at 455–56. 
 251. See id. at 456. 
 252. State v. Ewing, 518 S.W.2d 643, 647–49 (Mo. 1975). 
 253. People v. Giles, 662 P.2d 1073, 1076–77 (Colo. 1983) (en banc).  The 
Colorado Supreme Court also found no violation of the Due Process Clause or the 
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Id. at 1075–77. 
 254. Ewing, 518 S.W.2d at 648.  Although the Ewing case involved application of 
the escape statute to an insanity acquittee, the statute also criminalized escape by 
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persons who do not.255  The Colorado Supreme Court asserted that “the 
statutory procedures for civil commitment are not intended to apply to 
those persons whose illness has resulted in criminal conduct.”256  In 
contrast, an insanity acquittee has engaged in overt criminal conduct.  
Thus, a rational basis exists for legislation that protects the public from 
insanity acquittees, a special class of persons whose release from 
detention poses an imminent danger to public safety.257 
Shortly after the Jones case was decided, a New Jersey appellate court 
decision,258 citing Jones,259 and a New York Court of Appeals decision 
upholding post-trial, automatic commitment of insanity acquittees,260 
distinguished insanity acquittees from other civil committees for escape 
prosecution.  “[I]t is constitutionally permissible,” said the New Jersey 
court, “for the legislature to focus its penal enactment on the danger 
inherent in an escape by a person with a history of dangerous conduct.”261 
Because the Jones Court distinguished insanity acquittees from other 
candidates for civil commitment, other courts are likely to apply their 
states’ general criminal escape statute to insanity acquittees when such 
statutes are not applied to civil committees.  Some states have already 
enacted statutes specifically criminalizing escape by insanity acquittees 
but not by regularly civilly committed patients,262 and others may do so.  
Does Jones allow insanity acquittees to be specially identified for escape 
crime prosecution?  Does Jones answer the equal protection challenge? 
Although the Supreme Court stated “that insanity acquittees constitute 
a special class,”263 that statement must be considered in the context of 
the issues presented in the Jones case.  The Jones Court did not consider 
whether criminal escape statutes can be applied to insanity acquittees 
when they are not applied to other civilly committed patients.  The Jones 
 
criminal sexual psychopaths and persons accused of crime awaiting trial.  Id. at 647. 
 255. Id. at 647–48. 
 256. Giles, 662 P.2d at 1077. 
 257. Id. (citing People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040, 1053 (Colo. 1981)). 
 258. State v. Moore, 471 A.2d 41, 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983). 
 259. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364–65 n.13, 367 (1983)). 
 260. Id. (citing People ex rel. Henig v. Comm’r of Mental Hygiene, 372 N.E.2d 
304, 306 (N.Y. 1977)). 
 261. Id.  Four years earlier, the same court found that the state’s predecessor escape 
statute was “egregiously misapplied” to an insanity acquittee “and that the Legislature 
did not intend criminal culpability to attach to the wanderings of involuntarily committed 
persons suffering from mental illness.”  State v. Kyles, 399 A.2d 1027, 1029 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1979).  The post-trial confinement of an insanity acquittee was construed 
to be a civil commitment.  See id. at 1029.  New Jersey revised its escape statute in 
response to the Kyles decision.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-5(a) (West 1995). 
 262. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1026, 1026.4(a) (West Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 916.105, .1081 (West 2001); see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 263. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983); see supra notes 214–22 and 
accompanying text. 
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Court did not consider whether insanity acquittees are a new classification 
of mental patient, with characteristics both of mentally ill, sentence-
serving convicts and of mentally ill, civilly committed nonconvicts—but 
not quite either.  The issue in Jones was whether the finding of insanity 
in a criminal trial is sufficiently probative of the acquittee’s current 
mental illness and current dangerousness to justify commitment without 
the due process protections accorded others undergoing the civil 
commitment process.264  The Court held that the finding of insanity 
provided a sufficient foundation for commitment without any new 
hearing on the issues of mental illness and dangerousness.265  Thus, 
insanity acquittees are a special class only in the sense that the insanity 
finding may itself justify commitment of the acquittee as mentally ill and 
dangerous, whereas for civil commitment generally, a separate hearing is 
required to determine whether the potential committee is both mentally 
ill and dangerous.  Although the commitment procedures differ for 
insanity acquittees, the status of acquittees as civilly committed patients 
does not.266  Because insanity acquittees have not been convicted of 
crimes, they cannot be punished as criminals.267  When they are no 
longer mentally ill and dangerous, they are entitled to release.268 
The Jones Court held that proof that the insanity acquittee committed 
a criminal act satisfies the dangerousness requirement for post-trial 
 
 264. Jones, 463 U.S. at 363.  Michael Jones did not contest the government’s 
authority to confine mentally ill and dangerous persons indefinitely in mental health 
facilities.  Id. at 362.  He merely asserted that the criminal trial at which he was found 
not guilty by reason of insanity did not constitute an adequate hearing on the issues of 
current mental illness and current dangerousness to justify such commitment.  Id. 
 265. Id. at 366. 
 266. However, at least two, and perhaps as many as four, current Supreme Court 
Justices construe Jones as dealing with criminal, not civil, commitment of insanity 
acquittees.  See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 94 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Kennedy in dissenting.  Id. at 90.  Additionally, 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote a separate 
dissent, distinguishing insanity acquittees from civil committees.  See id. at 102, 107–15 
(Thomas, J. dissenting).  The dissenting justices asserted that a state may reasonably 
decide to continue the commitment of dangerous insanity acquittees, even if they are not 
mentally ill.  Id. at 111. 
 267. See id. at 80. 
 268. Id. at 77.  In Jones, the Court stated that the insanity acquittee “is entitled to 
release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous.”  Jones, 463 U.S. at 
368.  In Foucha, the Court clarified Jones by stating that the insanity acquittee “may be 
held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer.”  Foucha, 504 U.S. 
at 77. 
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commitment.269  However, such proof does not establish that the insanity 
acquittee is more dangerous than is a person civilly committed as 
mentally ill and dangerous.  Michael Jones, for example, was arrested 
for attempting to steal a jacket from a department store.  He was charged 
with attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum 
sentence of one year.270  He pleaded insanity, and his plea was not 
contested.271  The Jones majority rejected Jones’s assertion that the 
requisite dangerousness for commitment is not established by proof that 
he committed a nondangerous property crime.  “[V]iolence,” said the 
Court, has never been held to be “a prerequisite for a constitutional 
commitment.”272  According to the majority, the commission of a criminal 
act—even an attempted petit larceny—was “at least as persuasive as any 
predictions about dangerousness that might be made in a civil-
commitment proceeding.”273 
However, through court decision and legislative enactment, many 
jurisdictions require far more than a psychiatrist’s prediction of future 
dangerousness to justify civil commitment of a mentally ill person.  The 
commission of a petty larceny or other property crime,274 and a 
prediction that such crime might be repeated,275 are simply not enough.  
To justify civil commitment—a massive curtailment of one’s 
liberty276—many states require proof that the person did some recent 
 
 269. Jones, 463 U.S. at 364.  Ironically, when Jones pleaded insanity as a defense to 
the misdemeanor of attempted petit larceny, the prosecution did not contest the plea, and 
the facts were stipulated.  Without any evidence being submitted to prove that Jones 
committed a criminal act, the trial court found him not guilty by reason of insanity and 
committed him to St. Elizabeths Hospital.  Id. at 359–60.  Uncontested insanity verdicts 
are not uncommon; they are routine, occurring in many, if not most, cases in which the 
insanity defense is pleaded.  See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
INSANITY DEFENSE 112–13 (1994) (estimating that eighty to ninety-two percent of 
insanity defense pleas are uncontested). 
 270. Jones, 463 U.S. at 359. 
 271. Id. at 360. 
 272. Id. at 364–65. 
 273. Id. at 364. 
 274. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 176 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding 
unconstitutional a portion of Hawaii’s statute that authorized civil commitment of a 
mentally ill person who is “dangerous to property”). 
 275. Id. at 178 (holding that to justify civil commitment, the danger must be 
imminent). 
 276. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that involuntary hospitalization, 
especially when accompanied by coerced treatment, is “a massive curtailment of 
liberty.”  Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).  Those who are involuntarily 
hospitalized are categorized as “mental patients” and are subjected to psychiatric 
treatment that probes their innermost thoughts and to psychotropic medication that dulls 
and alters those thoughts.  Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324–25 (1993).  Forced 
administration of psychotropic medication during trial may violate a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133–38 
(1992).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that under the Due Process 
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overt act, or made an attempt or threat, of physical harm toward himself 
or another and a prediction that the person will do a similar act in the 
immediate future unless he is committed.277  Some states require even 
 
Clause, even sentence-serving convicts possess “a significant liberty interest in avoiding 
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.”  Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210, 221–22 (1990).  “The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s 
body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.”  Id. at 229.  
Involuntarily confined patients may also be subjected to mandatory behavior 
modification programs.  Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980).  People who are 
involuntarily hospitalized because they are dangerous are stigmatized by that finding.  
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1979).  Such stigma “can have a very 
significant impact on the individual.”  Id. at 426. 
 277. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West 1998) (requiring that to be 
subjected to a 180-day renewable civil commitment hold in California, the individual 
must have attempted, inflicted, or made a serious threat of substantial physical harm 
upon another person that either resulted in the individual’s confinement on a short-term 
evaluation or treatment hold or that occurred during that hold, and must continue to 
present a demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm upon others); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126 (1)(b)–(c), (2) (2001) (mandating that the court, in 
determining whether civil commitment is appropriate, shall consider whether the person 
“has recently, because of a mental disorder and through an act or an omission caused 
self-injury or injury to others” and “whether, because of a mental disorder, there is an 
imminent threat of injury to the [person] or to others because of the [person’s] acts or 
omissions” and providing that an “[i]mminent threat of self-inflicted injury or injury to 
others must be proved by overt acts or omissions, sufficiently recent in time as to be 
material and relevant as to the [person’s] present condition”); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-
1009, -1037 (1999) (defining mentally ill dangerous person as a mentally ill person who 
presents a “substantial risk of serious harm to another person or persons within the near 
future as manifested by evidence of recent violent acts or threats of violence or by 
placing others in reasonable fear of such harm” or who presents a “substantial risk of 
serious harm to himself or herself within the near future as manifested by evidence of 
recent attempts at, or threats of suicide or serious bodily harm,” and requiring that the 
person be found to be a mentally ill dangerous person in order to be subject to civil 
commitment); 50 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301(a), (b)(1), 7304, 7305 (West 2001) (providing 
that severely mentally disabled persons are subject to civil commitment and defining a 
severely mentally disabled person as posing “a clear and present danger of harm to 
others or to himself,” as “shown by establishing that within the past 30 days the person 
has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and that there is a 
reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated”); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 
1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that to justify civil commitment, the state must prove 
“that there is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do immediate 
harm to himself or others,” and this proof of dangerousness must be based “upon a finding of 
a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another”). 
Although the statutes discussed above establish the criteria for police power based 
civil commitment of dangerous mentally ill persons, many states also use their parens 
patriae authority to civilly commit mentally ill persons who are unable to provide for 
their basic necessities or who lack decisionmaking capacity.  See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE §§ 5008 (h)(1)(A), 5350, 5358(a)(1)–(2) (West 1998) (defining “gravely 
disabled” as “a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to 
provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter,” establishing a 
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more.  To establish that the person presents the requisite substantial 
probability of physical harm either to that individual or to others, the 
person must manifest that danger by doing a recent overt act, or by 
making an attempt or threat, of either suicide or homicide, or some other 
similar violent act.278  Although the Supreme Court has not required 
violence as a prerequisite for civil commitment,279 surely a nonviolent 
insanity acquittee is less dangerous than a mentally ill person whose 
attempted homicide or other violent act toward another was a 
prerequisite to that person’s commitment.  The fact that the insanity 
 
mental health conservatorship for a gravely disabled person, and authorizing the 
conservator to subject the conservatee to inpatient commitment); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
53-21-126(1)(a) (2001) (authorizing civil commitment of a person, who, “because of a 
mental disorder, is substantially unable to provide for [the person’s] own basic needs of 
food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009(2) (1999) 
(defining a person as a mentally ill dangerous person, and subject to civil commitment if 
he or she presents “[a] substantial risk of serious harm to himself or herself within the 
near future as manifested by . . . evidence of inability to provide for his or her basic 
human needs, including food, clothing, shelter, essential medical care, or personal 
safety”); 50 PA. STAT. ANN., §§ 7301(a), (b)(2), 7304, 7305 (West 2001).  The 
Pennsylvania statute provides that severely mentally disabled persons are subject to civil 
commitment and defines a severely mentally disabled person as posing “a clear and 
present danger of harm to others or to himself.”  Id. § 7301(a). 
Clear and present danger to himself shall be shown by establishing that within 
the past 30 days . . . the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that he 
would be unable, without care, supervision and the continued assistance of 
others, to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or 
self-protection and safety, and that there is a reasonable probability that death, 
serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30 
days unless adequate treatment were afforded under this act. 
Id. § 7301(b).  Parens patriae based civil commitment is beyond the scope of this Article.  
For a discussion of mental health conservatorships in California, see generally Grant H. 
Morris, Conservatorship for the “Gravely Disabled”: California’s Nondeclaration of 
Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201 (1978). 
 278. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(2)(a)–(b) (West Supp. 2002); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-10-101(a)(ii)(A)–(B) (Michie 2001).  The Wisconsin statute requires for civil 
commitment that the individual “[e]vidences a substantial probability of physical harm to 
himself or herself as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or 
serious bodily harm” or 
[e]vidences a substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals as 
manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior, or by 
evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and 
serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or 
threat to do serious physical harm. 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(2)(a)–(b).  The Wyoming statute defines “[d]angerous to 
himself or others” to mean that the person, as a result of mental illness “[e]vidences a 
substantial probability of physical harm to himself as manifested by evidence of recent 
threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm” or “[e]vidences a substantial 
probability of physical harm to other individuals as manifested by a recent overt 
homicidal act, attempt or threat or other violent act, attempt or threat which places others 
in reasonable fear of serious physical harm to them.”  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-
101(a)(ii)(A)–(B). 
 279. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 (1983). 
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acquittee’s trial established that the acquittee was not criminally 
responsible for his nonviolent conduct does not justify prosecution for 
the crime of escape when other escaping patients, who were civilly 
committed only when they were proven to be even more dangerous, are 
not.  Although not all insanity acquittees are absolved from criminal 
responsibility for nonviolent crimes, nevertheless, each and every 
insanity acquittee cannot be presumed to be more dangerous than each 
and every civilly committed mental patient.  Even if we assume that 
insanity acquittees as a class are more dangerous than other civil 
committees, that assumption does not establish that any particular person 
within the class is more dangerous.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court 
so aptly observed: “The decisive consideration where personal liberty is 
involved is that each individual’s fate must be adjudged on the facts of 
his own case, not on the general characteristics of a ‘class’ to which he 
may be assigned.”280 
For yet another reason, insanity acquittees should not be distinguished 
from other mental patients when they escape their confinement.  Not 
only may some insanity acquittees be less dangerous than civil 
committees, but also some insanity acquittees may be more seriously 
mentally ill—and thus less criminally culpable for their escape—than 
are civil committees.  After all, the Jones Court ruled that the finding of 
insanity in the criminal trial warrants an inference, not only of 
continuing dangerousness,281 but of continuing mental illness as well,282 
constituting an adequate basis to commit the insanity acquittee.  The 
Court rejected Jones’s contention that he was entitled to release because 
he had been hospitalized as an insanity acquittee for a longer period than 
he could have been incarcerated if he had been convicted of the petit 
larceny of which he had been charged.283  The hypothetical maximum 
 
 280. State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 299 (N.J. 1975). 
 281. Jones, 463 U.S. at 364. 
 282. Id. at 366. 
 283. Id. at 368–69.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by two other 
Justices, asserted that the Jones majority posed the wrong question.  The issue was not 
whether Jones was entitled to release because he was hospitalized longer than the 
hypothetical prison sentence he might have served if he had been convicted.  The 
appropriate issue was whether an insanity acquittal, without more, is a constitutionally 
adequate basis for indeterminate commitment to a mental health facility.  Id. at 371 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent, asserting that at the 
end of the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if Jones had been found 
guilty, he was presumptively entitled to his freedom, and if he was to be confined for a 
longer period, the state was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he 
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sentence to which Jones could have been sentenced if he had been 
convicted of the criminal charge did not establish the constitutional limit 
to his confinement as an insanity acquittee;284 in fact, it was irrelevant to 
the length of that confinement.285  Because Jones was not convicted, he 
could not be punished.  He was being confined for treatment, and he 
could be confined until he recovered his sanity.286 
If the finding of insanity warrants an inference of continuing mental 
illness and continuing dangerousness that justifies automatic commitment 
without any civil commitment hearing to determine the acquittee’s 
current mental condition or current dangerousness, and if that inference 
is sufficiently strong to permit the acquittee’s confinement beyond any 
hypothetical criminal sentence that could have been imposed if the 
acquittee had been found guilty, then what, if anything, justifies a 
nullification of that inference when the insanity acquittee escapes 
confinement before his sanity has been recovered?  The conclusion is 
inescapable: We really do not believe that insanity acquittees should be 
absolved from criminal responsibility for their criminal acts.  Although 
the law precludes us from punishing them for their previous crime, we 
hope to punish them now for their escape.287 
 
met the civil commitment criteria.  Id. at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  As one 
commentator maintained: “The issue is not how long Jones could be lawfully committed, 
but rather how long he could be confined under procedures different from those 
employed for general commitment patients.”  James W. Ellis, The Consequences of the 
Insanity Defense: Proposals to Reform Post-Acquittal Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 961, 981 (1986).  Despite the Jones decision, some states limit the special 
commitment period for insanity acquittees to the maximum sentence that could have 
been imposed if the acquittee had been found guilty of the crime.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 1026.5(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(8) (West Supp. 2003) (codifying, with some modifications, In 
re Moye, 584 P.2d 1097 (Cal. 1978), and limiting commitment of an insanity acquittee to 
the maximum term of imprisonment that could have been imposed if the acquittee had 
been found guilty but establishing a civil commitment procedure to confine for 
successive two-year periods those acquittees who by reason of mental disorder represent 
“a substantial danger of physical harm to others”). 
 284. Jones, 463 U.S. at 368. 
 285. Id. at 369. 
 286. Id.  The Supreme Court held that it was not unreasonable for Congress to 
determine that if insanity is successfully used as a defense to a crime, then such 
“insanity, once established, should be presumed to continue and . . . the accused should 
automatically be confined for treatment until it can be shown that he has recovered.”  Id. 
at 364 (quoting S. Rep. No. 84–1170, at 13 (1955)). 
 287. The Supreme Court of Colorado acknowledged “that an insanity adjudication 
results in a presumptive continuation of a state of mental incapacity until it is shown that 
sanity has been restored.”  People v. Giles, 662 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Colo. 1983).  However, 
the court upheld the conviction of an insanity acquittee for the crime of escape, 
reasoning that the presumption of insanity is not conclusive and irrebuttable.  A finding 
of insanity for a past crime does not grant immunity for all criminal acts committed by 
the insane person during his insanity commitment.  Id. at 1076.  Although the insanity 
acquittee in this case did not place in issue his mental capacity to commit the crime of 
escape, if he had done so, the state would have had to prove his sanity beyond a 
MORRIS.DOC 1/14/2020  2:30 PM 
[VOL. 40:  481, 2003]  Escaping the Asylum 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 531 
D.  Sexually Violent Predators 
In 1990, the state of Washington enacted the nation’s first SVP 
legislation.288  Within five years, a handful of states enacted similar, if 
not virtually identical, legislation.289  But unlike the sexual psychopath 
legislation that it replaced,290 SVP statutes did not merely substitute 
indeterminate confinement for determinate punishment, it added 
indeterminate confinement upon completion of the offender’s criminal 
sentence. 
In 1997, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Kansas’s 
 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 1075 n.4, 1076.  It should be noted, however, that many states 
today place the burden of proving insanity upon the defendant who pleads that defense.  
Should proof of an insanity acquittal, and an order that the acquittee be committed until 
sanity has been restored, establish conclusively that the committed acquittee was still 
insane at the time he escaped? 
 288. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010–.902 
(2002 & Supp. 2003)). 
 289. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to -3717 (West Supp. 2002) (enacted 
originally by 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 257); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3 
(West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (enacted originally by 1995 Cal. Stat. ch. 763, § 3); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a20 (1994 & Supp. 2002) (enacted originally by 1994 
Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 316); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185 (West Supp. 2003) (enacted 
originally by 1994 Minn. Laws, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 1, art. 1, § 4, which defined  “sexually 
dangerous person” in § 253B.02(18c)); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01–.13 (West 1998 & 
Supp. 2002) (enacted originally by 1993 Wis. Laws 479, § 40).  After the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of SVP legislation in Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346 (1997), several more states enacted SVP legislation.  See infra note 318. 
 290. Forty years ago, more than half the states had enacted sexual psychopath 
legislation.  Weiner, supra note 136, at 739.  Through such legislation, criminal defendants 
charged with or convicted of sex crimes and facing a determinate sentence could be 
detained indefinitely for treatment until they were no longer dangerous.  See id. at 740–41.  
Sexual psychopath legislation was discredited, however, by the inability of psychiatrists 
and other mental health professionals to identify a specific mental disorder experienced 
by individuals who should be included within the targeted group and by the lack of 
successful treatment methodologies to improve their condition.  Id. at 741–43.  The absence 
of treatment destroyed any valid basis for distinguishing sexual psychopath prisoners 
from other prisoners in order to subject them to indeterminate commitment.  Millard v. 
Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
Sexual psychopath legislation was also subjected to procedural due process challenges.  
For example, in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), a unanimous Supreme Court 
ruled that the possibility of indeterminate confinement based on a new finding of fact—that 
the person constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public, or is a habitual offender and 
mentally ill—entitled the person subjected to commitment under Colorado’s Sex 
Offenders Act to the full panoply of due process protections, including the right to 
counsel, to have an opportunity to be heard, to be confronted with witnesses, to cross-
examine, to offer evidence of his own, and to have findings adequate to make a 
meaningful appeal.  Id. at 607–10. 
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SVP Act291 against three claims of constitutional infirmity.292  Under the 
Kansas statute, a sentence-expiring convict could be civilly committed 
as an SVP if he had a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder” 
that made him “likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence.”293  
In Kansas v. Hendricks,294 the Court held that the Act satisfied 
substantive due process requirements.295  Justice Thomas, writing for the 
Court’s five-Justice majority, noted that civil commitment statutes have 
been sustained when they limit the class of persons eligible for 
confinement to those who, because of mental illness, are dangerous and 
are unable to control their dangerousness.296  Although the Kansas 
statute used the term “mental abnormality” rather than “mental illness,” 
Justice Thomas dismissed the importance of the distinction, declaring 
that “the term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of any talismanic significance.”297  
The legislature may define terms of a medical nature for legal purposes 
and need not mirror the definitions of the medical profession.298 
The majority also found that the Act did not violate the Constitution’s 
prohibition against double jeopardy299 or ex post facto lawmaking.300  The 
Court accepted as true the legislature’s stated intention to create a new 
civil commitment scheme for SVPs, rather than to inflict additional 
punishment for past criminal acts.301  Hendricks failed to sustain the heavy 
 
 291. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a20 (1994 & Supp. 2002). 
 292. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371. 
 293. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a02(a), 59-29a07 (Supp. 2002).  As originally 
enacted, and as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hendricks, the statute defining SVPs 
referred to “predatory act of sexual violence.”  1994 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 316, § 2.  The 
statute has been amended and now refers to “repeat acts of sexual violence.”  KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 59-29a02(a). 
 294. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 295. Id. at 356–60.  The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state “shall 
deprive any person of . . . liberty without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 296. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358. 
 297. Id. at 359.  Justice Thomas used, without attribution, language employed by 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin two years earlier.  In a decision upholding the 
constitutionality of Wisconsin’s SVP statutes, that court stated: “[T]here is no talismanic 
significance that should be given to the term ‘mental illness.’”  State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 
115, 122 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied, Post v. Wisconsin, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997). 
 298. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359. 
 299. Id. at 360–70.  The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall “be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 300. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 370–71.  Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the United 
States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provides that no “ex post facto Law shall be passed.”  U.S. CONST art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 301. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.  But see State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d at 137 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  In dissenting from a pre-Hendricks Wisconsin Supreme 
Court decision upholding the constitutionality of that state’s SVP statutes, Justice 
Abrahamson asserted, “If reference to treatment were sufficient to render a statute civil, 
however,  [Wisconsin’s statutes] governing prisons and jails, would be transmogrified 
into a civil statute.”  Id. 
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burden of proving that the legislation was punitive either in purpose or 
effect.302  Incapacitation303—depriving the dangerously mentally ill of 
their freedom—is a “legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective.”304  
Thus, even if SVPs suffer from an untreatable condition, they may be 
detained so long as they pose a danger to others.305  If treatment is 
possible, the fact that the state provides treatment only incidentally to its 
primary incapacitation objective does not render the statutes punitive.306  
Because the Act was found to have a nonpunitive purpose, neither a 
double jeopardy nor an ex post facto claim could be sustained.307  
Hendricks was not subjected to multiple punishments because SVP civil 
commitment is neither punishment that follows a second prosecution for 
the same crime for which he served a criminal sentence308 nor punishment 
for conduct that was legal before the statutes were enacted.309 
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion.  Three of the four 
dissenting Justices agreed with the majority that a state may enact 
separate civil commitment statutes applicable to different categories of 
committable individuals.310  Hendricks could be civilly committed as an 
SVP because he suffered from a mental disorder—pedophilia—and 
 
 302. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.  In finding that the SVP Act was not proven to 
have a punitive purpose, the majority noted that, unlike a criminal statute, the Act did 
“not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct” and did not require scienter for 
commitment.  Id. at 362.  The Act did not function as a deterrent because those 
committed as SVPs are unable to exercise control over their behavior and are “unlikely 
to be deterred by the threat of confinement.”  Id. at 362–63.  Additionally, SVPs 
experience essentially the same conditions experienced by other civilly committed 
persons, not the more restrictive conditions experienced by prisoners.  Id. at 363.  The 
Act’s use of criminal process-type procedural safeguards to identify those who are civilly 
committable did not convert the proceedings into criminal proceedings.  Id. at 364–65. 
 303. Id. at 365. 
 304. Id. at 363. 
 305. Id. at 365–66. 
 306. Id. at 366–67. 
 307. Id. at 369. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 371.  Although Justice Kennedy joined in the Court’s majority, he wrote 
a short concurring opinion expressing his concern about the use of civil commitment 
laws to confine those who have already been punished through the criminal process.  Id. 
at 371–72 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  He cautioned that if civil confinement is used to 
achieve retribution or general deterrence rather than mere incapacitation, it cannot be 
validated.  Id. at 373.  If “mental abnormality” proves too uncertain a category to justify 
civil commitment, its use cannot be condoned.  Id. 
 310. Id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsberg did not join in this portion 
of Justice Breyer’s opinion and wrote no separate opinion expressing the reasons for her 
decision.  Id. at 373. 
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lacked the ability to control his dangerous actions.311  Without 
considering separately whether substantive due process requires the state 
“to provide treatment that it concedes is potentially available to a person 
whom it concedes is treatable,”312 the four dissenters focused on the ex 
post facto claim that posed the same issue.313  In their view, the statutes 
impermissibly imposed punishment by delaying treatment until Hendricks 
completed his prison sentence.314  Under the Act, diagnosis, evaluation, 
and commitment proceedings—prerequisites for treatment—did not 
occur until the convict’s criminal sentence was about to expire.315  
Additionally, when commitment proceedings were conducted, the 
decisionmaker was not required to consider less restrictive alternatives 
to confinement.316  And when Hendricks was civilly committed as an 
SVP, the record supported the Kansas Supreme Court’s finding that the 
state did not provide treatment.317 
Although the Court upheld the constitutionality of SVP legislation by 
the narrowest of margins, many states responded quickly to the 
Hendricks decision by enacting SVP legislation.318  More can be 
expected to join them.319  To avoid constitutional problems, the legislation 
 
 311. Id. at 374–77. 
 312. Id. at 378. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 381. 
 315. Id. at 385 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a)(1)). 
 316. Id. at 387. 
 317. Id. at 390 (noting that the Kansas Supreme Court found that Hendricks was 
untreated, not that he was untreatable); see also id. at 392 (“Kansas was not providing 
treatment to Hendricks.”).  Under such circumstances, the dissenters agreed with the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s finding that the treatment provisions of the statutes were “somewhat 
disingenuous.”  Id. at 393 (citing In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1966)). 
 318. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910–.931 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 207/1–207/99 (2002); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1-16 (West 2000 
& Supp. 2002); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480–.513 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 30:4-27.24 to .38 (West Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (Law. 
Co-op. 2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.147 (Vernon Supp. 
2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-70.1 to .19 (Michie Supp. 2002) (effective Jan. 1, 2004).  
The Illinois statutes were enacted one week after Hendricks was decided.  1997 Ill. Laws 
90-40 (approved June 30, 1997, effective Jan. 1, 1998).  North Dakota enacted its SVP 
statutes on April 8, 1997, two months prior to the Hendricks decision, although the 
statutes became effective more than a month after Hendricks was decided.  1997 N.D. 
Laws ch. 243, § 1 (approved and filed Apr. 8, 1997, effective Aug. 1, 1997, and codified 
as N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01 to -23 (2002)). 
 319. In Hendricks, thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and three territories 
joined in an amicus brief supporting Kansas’s position that SVP legislation is an 
appropriate and constitutional method to protect citizens from sexually dangerous 
persons.  Brief of Amici Curiae States of Washington et al. at 2, Hendricks (No. 95-
1649).  The brief addressed the substantive due process issue.  The state of Wisconsin 
wrote a separate amicus brief addressing ex post facto and double jeopardy issues.  Brief 
of Amicus Curiae State of Wisconsin, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649 & 95-9075).  The multi-
state brief expressed its approval of, and expressly adopted, Wisconsin’s arguments.  
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typically mimics the Kansas model.320 
Appellate courts have not yet considered whether SVPs can be 
prosecuted for escape under general escape statutes or whether newly 
enacted statutes specifically criminalizing escape by SVPs, but not by 
regularly civilly committed patients,321 will survive an equal protection 
challenge.  Commitment under an SVP statute is a civil commitment, 
and therefore, SVPs are civil mental patients.  If other civil mental 
patients are not subject to prosecution for the crime of escape, arguably, 
subjecting SVPs to escape prosecution denies them equal protection of 
the laws.  Although SVPs are committed under different criteria than are 
other civilly committed mental patients, states generally do not 
criminalize escape by any other civilly committed mental patients, 
 
Brief of Amici Curiae States of Washington et al. at 2, Hendricks (No. 95-1649). 
 320. For example, many of the statutes begin with a statement of legislative 
findings borrowed, nearly verbatim, from the Kansas statute, as it was originally enacted, 
1994 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 316, § 1, or from the Washington statute from which the 
Kansas statute was derived: 
  The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of 
sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that 
renders them appropriate for [the existing involuntary civil commitment law], 
which is intended to be a short-term civil commitment system that is primarily 
designed to provide short-term treatment to individuals with serious mental 
disorders and then return them to the community.  In contrast to persons 
appropriate for civil commitment . . . , sexually violent predators generally 
have personality disorders and/or mental abnormalities which are unamenable 
to existing mental illness treatment modalities and those conditions render 
them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.  The legislature further 
finds that [SVPs’] likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual 
violence is high.  The existing involuntary commitment [laws are] inadequate 
to address the risk [of reoffense] . . . .  The legislature further finds that the 
prognosis for curing [SVPs] is poor, the treatment needs of this population are 
very long term, and the treatment modalities for this population are very 
different than the traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for 
commitment under [the existing involuntary civil commitment law]. 
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 
(Supp. 2002).  States that begin their SVP Acts with a similar statement of legislative 
findings include: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701 (West Supp. 2002) (quoting 1995 Ariz. 
Sess. Laws ch. 257, § 10, which includes the legislature’s findings within the notes to the 
statute); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (quoting 1995 Cal. 
Stat. ch. 763, § 3, which includes the legislature’s findings within the historical notes to the 
statute); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (West 2002); IOWA CODE § 229A.1 (West 2000); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.25 (West Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-20 (Law. Co-op. 
2002); and TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001 (Vernon Supp. 2003). 
 321. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.927(1) (West 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
229A.5B(1)–(2) (West Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-70.18 (Michie Supp. 2002) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.76.115 (West Supp. 2003). 
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regardless of differences in the criteria for their commitment.  
Prosecution for escape does not occur whether the patients have been 
committed through the state’s police power as dangerously mentally ill 
or whether they have been committed through the state’s parens patriae 
authority as unable to provide for basic necessities or lacking in 
decisionmaking capacity.322  To prosecute SVPs for the crime of escape 
impermissibly distinguishes them from all other civilly committed patients. 
In an analogous context, the Supreme Court of Washington has 
repeatedly held that the equal protection clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions require that less restrictive alternatives to confinement must 
be considered at SVP commitment trials, just as such alternatives are 
required to be considered for patients undergoing commitment through the 
regular civil commitment statutes.323  Because not all SVPs present the 
same level of danger or require identical treatment conditions, no rational 
basis exists for refusing to consider alternatives to confinement of SVPs 
while according such consideration to all other patients.324  One could 
assert that if SVPs are similarly situated with other civil mental patients 
for consideration of less restrictive alternatives to confinement, they are 
similarly situated with other civil mental patients for other purposes, 
including exemption from criminal prosecution when they escape. 
But such an assertion would not go uncontested.  Even prior to the 
Supreme Court’s Hendricks decision, the supreme courts of 
Wisconsin325 and Minnesota326 rejected equal protection attacks 
premised on differences in substantive standards and procedures for SVP 
commitment than for other civil commitment.  “The state’s compelling 
interest in protecting the public,” said the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 
“provides the necessary justification for the differential treatment of the 
class of sexually violent persons whose mental disorders make them 
distinctively dangerous because of the substantial probability that they 
 
 322. See supra note 277 (citing statutes providing for police power and parens 
patriae civil commitment). 
 323. In re Brooks, 36 P.3d 1034, 1037 (Wash. 2001); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 
1012 (Wash. 1993). 
 324. Young, 857 P.2d at 1012.  In 1995, the Washington Legislature, responding to 
the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Young, amended the SVP statute to permit 
a consideration of less restrictive alternatives to confinement for SVPs only after the 
commitment trial that determines whether the person is an SVP.  Brooks, 36 P.3d at 
1039.  Nevertheless, in 2001, the Washington Supreme Court found no reason to depart 
from its position in Young, holding that SVPs are similarly situated with other civilly 
committed mental patients for the purpose of considering less restrictive alternatives to 
confinement at the time of the commitment decision.  Id. at 1042. 
 325. State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 130–32 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Post v. 
Wisconsin, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997). 
 326. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 186–87 (Minn. 1996), vacated and remanded for 
reconsideration in light of Hendricks sub nom., Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997). 
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will commit future crimes of sexual violence.”327  The legislature may 
“address complex social problems in more than one way”328 and may 
create and implement “a variety of solutions aimed at controlling a 
variety of ills.”329  The legislature may determine that, because of their 
predisposition to sexual violence, SVPs as a class pose a higher danger 
to the community than do other mentally ill persons.  This heightened 
danger and the unique treatment needs of SVPs justify a distinct 
legislative approach to protect the public.330  The equal protection 
argument, said the Minnesota Supreme Court, “ignores the fact that the 
sexual predator poses a danger that is unlike any other.”331 
After the Hendricks Court placed its imprimatur upon SVP legislation, 
several state supreme courts rejected equal protection challenges to their 
states’ SVP legislation.332  The Florida Supreme Court, for example, 
held that a legislative decision precluding consideration of less 
restrictive alternatives to SVP confinement does not violate equal 
protection of the laws despite the legislative policy requiring utilization 
of least restrictive appropriate treatment for regularly civilly committed 
patients.333  SVPs, said the court, are not similarly situated with other 
 
 327. Post, 541 N.W.2d at 130. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id.  Although the Wisconsin SVP statute survived equal protection challenges 
to differences in both the substantive standards and procedures for commitment, the 
court upheld the right of SVPs to jury trials at discharge hearings as is provided to other 
civilly committed mental patients.  Id. at 132–33. 
 331. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn. 1994) (upholding the Minnesota 
Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act against a claim that it violated equal 
protection).  In Linehan, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that “Blodgett controls our 
analysis.”  557 N.W.2d at 186 (stating that deference to legislative judgment is due 
because the legislature “permissibly drew genuine and substantial distinctions that define a 
class of dangerous and mentally disordered persons who victimize others in a particular 
manner”). 
 332. See, e.g., Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 604–05 (Cal. 1999) 
(holding that the required finding of present dangerousness for SVP commitment is not 
“materially distinct” from the dangerousness criterion used in other commitment statutes, 
and therefore, SVPs are not subjected to disparate treatment); In re Samuelson, 727 
N.E.2d 228, 236–37 (Ill. 2000) (holding that, without offending equal protection, the 
legislature may accord different rights to defendants in criminal cases and to persons 
undergoing regular civil commitment than to persons undergoing civil commitment as 
SVPs); In re Campbell, 986 P.2d 771, 777 (Wash. 1999) (holding that SVPs are not 
similarly situated with other mentally disordered persons undergoing traditional civil 
commitment and that differences in the statutes as to who qualifies as an expert to sign a 
commitment petition are rationally related to the differences between the two groups). 
 333. Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 111–12 (Fla. 2002). 
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civilly committed mental patients.334  The legislature distinguished SVPs 
as having “antisocial personality features which are unamenable to 
existing mental illness treatment modalities” that “render them likely to 
engage in criminal, sexually violent behavior.”335  Their “‘treatment 
needs . . . are very long term’ and necessitate very different treatment 
modalities from those appropriate for [other civilly committed mental 
patients].”336  By legislative definition: 
only those individuals who require long-term treatment in a secure facility 
qualify for commitment under [Florida’s SVP statutes] and no less restrictive 
alternative is appropriate for these individuals.  In contrast, involuntary 
commitment under [Florida’s regular civil commitment statutes] is intended to 
provide “intensive short-term . . . treatment” to persons with serious mental 
disorders and return them “to the community as soon as possible.”337 
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court did not consider whether special 
civil commitment legislation for SVPs violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.  The Court did not consider whether prosecution of SVPs for the 
crime of escape when other civilly committed mental patients are not 
prosecuted violates the Equal Protection Clause.  In fact, the words 
“equal protection” do not appear even once in Justice Thomas’s majority 
opinion, in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, or in Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion.338  But given the Court’s rejection of Hendricks’s 
 
 334. Id. at 112. 
 335. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.910); see supra note 320. 
 336. Westerheide, 831 So. 2d at 112 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.910). 
 337. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.453). 
 338. Leroy Hendricks did raise an equal protection claim in his cross-petition to the 
Supreme Court.  Conditional Cross Petition at 17, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 
(1997) (No. 95-9075).  However, his brief as cross-petitioner did not argue the equal 
protection claim.  In a footnote, the cross-petitioner stated: “Mr. Hendricks’ cross-
petition also sought review of his equal protection challenge to the statute.  This claim 
will be subsumed in his substantive due process argument, and will not be separately 
briefed.”  Brief for Leroy Hendricks Cross-Petitioner, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-
9075), available at 1996 WL 450661, at *2 n.1.  In the brief submitted by Kansas as 
cross-respondent, Kansas asserted that Hendricks abandoned his equal protection claim 
by failing to argue its merits in his cross-petitioner’s brief and requested that the Court so 
rule.  Brief of Cross-Respondent, Hendricks (No. 95-9075), available at 1996 WL 
509502, at *4, *39–40.  The state characterized this failure as an apparent attempt to 
evade the page limit requirements established by Supreme Court rule “or to manipulate 
the briefing process” by forcing the state either to address first the equal protection claim 
that Hendricks alone had raised or to wait until the state’s final reply brief to respond.  
Id. at *40.  In his reply brief as cross-petitioner, Hendricks did not address the state’s 
argument.  See Reply Brief for Cross Petitioner, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075), 
available at 1996 WL 593579. 
The Supreme Court did not discuss the question of whether Hendricks’s equal 
protection claim could be appropriately subsumed within his substantive due process 
argument or comment on the state’s request for a ruling that Hendricks had abandoned 
his equal protection claim.  The Court merely noted that Hendricks’s cross-petition 
asserted double jeopardy and ex post facto claims.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350 (1997). 
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substantive due process argument, it is unlikely that the Court would 
have accepted an equal protection argument that equated SVPs with 
other civilly committed mental patients.339  The Hendricks majority 
found that the legislature may identify for civil commitment purposes “a 
limited subclass of dangerous persons.”340  The Kansas SVP Act met 
that requirement by restricting SVP commitment to individuals who 
have a mental abnormality or personality disorder rendering them unable 
to control their dangerousness.341  Even three of the four dissenting 
Justices agreed that Kansas is not constitutionally prohibited from 
adopting two separate civil commitment statutes “each covering 
somewhat different classes of committable individuals.”342  Thus, while 
Washington and other states may choose to consider less restrictive 
alternatives to confinement for SVPs who are not so dangerous that they 
need to be confined,343 for those dangerous SVPs who must be confined, 
an equal protection argument that they are no more dangerous than other 
civilly committed mental patients is likely to fail. 
Post-Hendricks Supreme Court decisions also suggest that the Court 
will not be receptive to an equal protection claim that escape by SVPs 
cannot be criminalized because SVPs are similarly situated with other 
civilly committed mental patients who are not subject to such 
prosecution.  The Court has both contracted the rights of SVPs and 
expanded the group of persons who can be identified as SVPs.  In 2001, 
the Supreme Court ruled that if a state court finds that the legislature had 
a legitimate, nonpunitive purpose for enacting SVP legislation—and 
incapacitation of mentally abnormal persons to protect society from 
sexually violent acts associated with that abnormality is such a 
purpose—then an SVP may not claim that the legislation, as 
implemented and applied to him, was punitive.344  Even though the 
Special Commitment Center, which housed all of Washington’s SVPs, 
was located within the perimeter of a Department of Corrections facility, 
 
 339. See Grant H. Morris, The Evil that Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish 
Perverts, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1213–17 (asserting that an equal protection argument 
that SVPs are similarly situated with other civilly committed patients will not succeed). 
 340. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357. 
 341. Id. at 358. 
 342. Id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 343. See supra notes 323–24 and accompanying text. 
 344. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001).  The Court held: “An Act, found to 
be civil, cannot be deemed punitive ‘as applied’ to a single individual in violation of the 
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause for release.”  Id. at 267. 
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conditions at the Center were incompatible with statute’s stated goal of 
treatment, and there was no possibility of release,345 the Supreme Court 
refused to consider the possibility that the legislature’s intent was to punish 
SVPs by confining them for life—without treatment and without hope.346 
In 2002, the Supreme Court broadened the permissible definition of 
SVPs, holding that in SVP commitment proceedings, the state is not 
required to prove that the person is completely unable to control his 
dangerous behavior.347  He can be labeled an SVP so long as a mental 
abnormality makes it difficult for him to do so.348 
In upholding the Kansas SVP Act against due process, double 
jeopardy, and ex post facto claims, the Hendricks Court found “that the 
Kansas Legislature [had] taken great care to confine only a narrow class 
of particularly dangerous individuals.”349  SVPs, who by definition are 
likely to engage in predatory350 acts of sexual violence and who, because 
of mental disorder, are unable to control or have great difficulty in 
controlling351 their behavior are more dangerous as a group than are 
other civilly committed mental patients.  An equal protection claim that 
asserts that SVPs are similarly situated with other mental patients for civil 
commitment purposes or for criminal prosecution for escape is likely to fail. 
Nevertheless, because SVP legislation is applicable to only some 
persons who can be categorized as SVPs, such legislation may be 
 
 345. Id. at 259–60. 
 346. See id. at 263 (“The civil nature of a confinement scheme cannot be altered 
based merely on vagaries in the implementation of the authorizing statute.”). 
 347. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002). 
 348. Id. at 411–14.  State courts have also broadened the SVP definition.  For 
example, in 2002, the California Supreme Court ruled that the SVP statute’s definitional 
requirement that the person be “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without 
appropriate treatment and custody”, does not mean that the risk of such conduct be 
greater than fifty percent.  People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 954, 968 
(Cal. 2002) (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(d) (emphasis added)).  The 
“likely” standard is met if the person “presents a substantial danger—that is, a serious 
and well-founded risk—of criminal sexual violence.”  Id. at 954.  Even though, as a 
concurring justice pointed out, the word “likely” in ordinary and legal usage means 
“having a better chance of occurring than not,” and that virtually all violent offenders 
with a sexual disorder would qualify for SVP commitment under the majority’s 
“substantial danger” standard, id. at 977–79 (Werdegar, J., concurring), the majority, 
nevertheless adopted the expanded definition, id. at 968. 
 349. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364 (1997).  In summarizing the reasons 
for the Court’s decision, Justice Thomas characterized the Act as limiting “confinement 
to a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals.”  Id. at 368. 
 350. Since the decision in Hendricks, the Kansas legislature has amended the statute 
to require a likelihood of “repeat” acts of sexual violence instead of “predatory” acts of 
sexual violence.  See supra note 293. 
 351. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411–14 (holding that “difficulty” in controlling sexually 
violent behavior, not complete or total lack of control, is sufficient to qualify a person as 
an SVP); see supra notes 347–48 and accompanying text. 
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vulnerable to a different equal protection attack.352  The Kansas SVP 
Act, just as most states’ SVP legislation, does not authorize civil 
commitment of all those who suffer from a mental disorder, no matter 
how narrowly or broadly defined, and who are likely to engage in 
predatory acts of sexual violence.  Rather, SVP commitment is limited 
only to persons who fit within one of three groups who are about to be 
released from confinement: sentence-expiring convicts, persons found 
mentally incompetent to stand trial, and insanity acquittees.353 
Individuals who do not fit into one of these three categories are not 
subject to SVP commitment even if they are equally likely to engage in 
sexually violent conduct and are unable to control their dangerousness 
due to mental abnormality or personality disorder.  Thus, for example, 
ex-convicts who were punished for sexually violent crimes and who 
could be predicted to commit additional sexually violent crimes are not 
subject to SVP commitment if they already served their criminal 
sentences and were released from confinement before the SVP Act was 
enacted.  Criminal defendants charged with, but not yet convicted of, 
sexually violent offenses and who could be predicted to commit 
additional sexually violent crimes are not subject to SVP commitment.  
Criminal defendants who have been charged with violent crimes, but not 
sexually violent crimes, are not subject to SVP commitment.  
Individuals who have not yet been charged with sexually violent crimes, 
and indeed, individuals who have not yet committed such crimes are not 
subject to SVP commitment.  And yet, in each case, their mental 
abnormalities or personality disorders and their difficulty in controlling 
their sexual urges may make them equally dangerous with those who are 
about to be released from confinement and who have been legislatively 
targeted for special SVP commitment.354  Although the Supreme Court 
 
 352. See Morris, supra note 339, at 1217–27 (asserting that a successful equal 
protection argument may be made that sentence-expiring convicts and others who may 
be identified as SVPs and subjected to SVP commitment are similarly situated with other 
persons identifiable as SVPs but not subject to SVP commitment). 
 353. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a03, 59-29a04 (Supp. 2000). 
 354. Consider, for example, the case of In re Diestelhorst, 716 N.E.2d 823 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1999).  A pedophile, released after serving a ten-year prison term for sexually 
molesting children, attempted to lure a young girl into his car.  He was apprehended and 
pled guilty to the crime of child abduction.  Id. at 824.  As his sentence was expiring, the 
state petitioned for SVP commitment.  Id. at 825.  Despite expert testimony that the 
prisoner had a “lingering sexual penchant for children,” id., the appellate court dismissed 
the petition, id. at 829.  Child abduction is not a sexually violent offense, and under 
Illinois law, only those who are completing confinement for a sexually violent offense 
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permits the legislature “to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine 
its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be 
clearest,”355 the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the legislature from 
discriminating between individuals when the they pose an equal danger.  
The state has no compelling interest to so discriminate. 
Baxstrom v. Herold356 and Jackson v. Indiana357 tell us that sentence-
expiring convicts and permanently incompetent criminal defendants 
cannot be specially classified for civil commitment purposes.  SVP 
legislation, however, separately categorizes these individuals for SVP 
commitment.  Baxstrom and Jackson tell us that the same civil commitment 
standards and procedures must be applied to sentence-expiring convicts 
and permanently incompetent defendants that are applied to any other 
nonconvicts.  SVP legislation, however, applies different commitment 
standards and procedures to these individuals for SVP commitment.  If 
sentence-expiring convicts and permanently incompetent defendants can 
only be involuntarily confined as are other civilly committed patients, 
then they are civilly committed patients, and cannot be morphed into 
SVPs or another special hybrid class of patient with “criminal” as well 
as “civil” features. 
Although Jones v. United States358 tells us that insanity acquittees can 
be specially classified for post-criminal trial confinement without 
undergoing the civil commitment process, their special classification for 
SVP commitment purposes cannot be justified.  Insanity acquittees are 
not subject to SVP commitment immediately after their criminal trials, 
but rather only after they are about to be released from confinement as 
insanity acquittees.359  Such release does not occur until the acquittee is 
no longer dangerous, that is, is not likely to cause harm either to the 
acquittee or others.360  Thus, an insanity acquittee who currently “suffers 
 
are subject to SVP commitment.  Id. at 827.  The court rejected the state’s argument that 
SVP commitment is appropriate because the crime, although not specifically defined as 
violent, was sexually motivated.  Id. at 827–29.  The perpetrator, according to the state, 
sought to gratify “an aberrant sexual preference.  He wanted to sexually molest his prey.”  
Id. at 826.  If, as the court assumed, the state correctly assessed the criminal’s 
motivation, would  anyone believe that this individual is less sexually dangerous than 
another pedophile who was not apprehended until after he sexually molested a child and 
who was therefore subject to SVP commitment? 
 355. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940). 
 356. 383 U.S. 107 (1966); see supra notes 99–110 and accompanying text. 
 357. 406 U.S. 715 (1972); see supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text. 
 358. 463 U.S. 354 (1983); see supra notes 214–22 and accompanying text. 
 359. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a03, 59-29a04 (Supp. 2000). 
 360. Id. §§ 22-3428(3) (authorizing transfer to a less restrictive hospital environment, 
conditional release, or discharge), 22-3428(7) (defining “mentally ill person” as one who 
“is likely to cause harm to self or others,” that is, one who “is likely, in the reasonably 
foreseeable future, to cause substantial physical injury or physical abuse to self or others 
or substantial damage to another’s property, or evidenced by behavior causing, 
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from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes [him] 
likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence”—the definitional 
criteria for SVP adjudication361—is unlikely to be released from insanity 
acquittee commitment as not dangerous.  In reality, insanity acquittees 
who are not too dangerous to be released from insanity acquittee 
confinement but who are dangerous enough to be confined as SVPs do 
not exist.  Insanity acquittees, therefore, are not a special category for 
SVP commitment purposes; they are a noncategory. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC WITHOUT                      
PUNISHING THE UNPUNISHABLE 
Laws that criminalize escape by involuntarily confined mental patients 
attempt to enhance public security by discouraging escape from mental 
health facilities.  Typically, those laws do not specifically apply to 
civilly committed mental patients and are not construed by courts to 
apply to them.  In essence, criminalization of escape by “regular” mental 
patients is rejected as a poor, or unneeded, public policy decision.  
Society is reluctant to punish mentally ill people, especially those who 
are so severely mentally ill that they must be involuntarily hospitalized.  
However, legislatures and courts are more willing to criminalize escape 
by “special” civilly committed patients, such as sentence-expiring 
convicts, incompetent criminal defendants, insanity acquittees, and 
SVPs.  This Article asserts that criminalizing escape by some or all of 
these specially categorized patients violates equal protection of the laws.  
But if we cannot deter their escape by criminalizing such conduct, can we 
facilitate the public’s legitimate interest in security through other measures? 
A.  Enhancing Security 
First, security measures should be employed for every mental patient, 
whether regularly or specially committed, that are appropriate to the risk 
of escape and the danger presented if escape occurs.  As Henry Weihofen 
noted more than forty years ago: “What security measures are needed 
depends on the diagnosis of the individual patient’s mental condition—not 
on the type of crime that he has committed or with which he is 
 
attempting, or threatening such injury, abuse or neglect”).  In many states, insanity 
acquittees may not be released until a court finds that they are no longer dangerous to 
others.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2 (West Supp. 2003). 
 361. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2000). 
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charged.”362  After Ronald Rogers escaped from Atascadero State Hospital, 
a ten-foot tall fence with double rows of razor wire at the top and a single 
row along the bottom was installed on the single-story roof of the 
Administration Building from which he escaped.363  A double fence now 
completely encircles the facility.  A security alarm is being installed that 
will sound if contact is made with the fence.  Internal courtyards are 
surrounded by razor wire topped walls on two-story buildings or by 
sixteen-foot tall fencing where no walls exist.364  Other security measures 
include guards in observation towers and patrolling hospital grounds 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week365 and a personal count of 
each patient conducted six times within each twenty-four hour period.366 
Security measures can minimize, if not eliminate, patient escapes.  No 
patient has escaped from Atascadero since new security measures were 
implemented.  Even before security was heightened, escape from 
Atascadero was rare.  In the ten years prior to Ronald Rogers’s escape, 
only two patients escaped, and one of those was apprehended within 
twenty minutes.367  There is no record of any crime being committed by 
an escapee, including the one patient who escaped over nine years ago 
and who has not been apprehended.368  Atascadero’s escape record is not 
unique.  Years ago, a New York Supreme Court justice noted that when 
 
 362. Henry Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of 
Insanity, 38 TEX. L. REV. 849, 856 (1960); see also supra notes 65–67 and 
accompanying text (asserting that even security measures for a convict mental patient 
depend upon the pathology and severity of the patient’s illness, not upon his status as a 
prisoner). 
 363. E-mail from Barrie Hafler, Public Relations Officer, Atascadero State 
Hospital, to Grant Morris, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law 
(Jan. 3, 2003, 12:37:43 PST) (on file with author). 
 364. Id.  See generally L.W. Allan, State Hospital: Recent Upgrades Intended to 
Make It Even More Secure, ATASCADERO NEWS, May 1, 2002, at A-1; Rachel 
Robertshaw, Sexually Violent Predator Escapes ASH, ATASCADERO NEWS, Sept. 26, 
2001, at A-1. 
 365. Allan, supra note 364. 
 366. Robertshaw, supra note 364.  On the day that Ronald Rogers escaped, staff 
observed what appeared to be Rogers asleep in his room.  However, the staff failed to 
follow the hospital’s policy of verifying Rogers’s presence by making visual contact 
with him.  Id.; see supra note 2. 
 367. E-mail from Barrie Hafler, Public Relations Officer, Atascadero State 
Hospital, to Grant Morris, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law 
(Nov. 20, 2002, 10:42:09 PST) (on file with author).  Cleopus Johnson, a mentally ill 
prisoner, escaped on August 15, 1993 and is still missing.  James Howe, who was 
awaiting trial to determine whether he was committable as an SVP, escaped on February 
2, 1999 and was apprehended within twenty minutes.  Ronald Rogers, an SVP, escaped 
on September 23, 2001 and was apprehended in Oregon on October 1, 2001.  A fourth 
patient, Duane Harris, committed as incompetent to stand trial, bolted from custody 
while he was at a medical diagnostic appointment in the community.  After fifteen 
minutes of chase, he was brought into custody.  This incident was not recorded as an 
escape from the hospital.  Id. 
 368. Id. 
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patients were sent to the two maximum security mental hospitals in that 
state, “nobody escaped.”369 
B.  Providing Treatment Opportunities 
Maximum security is not appropriate for each and every involuntarily 
confined mental patient.  And whatever security measures are 
appropriate to prevent escape should not detract from treatment 
opportunities available to patients within the facility.  In fact, actively 
engaging patients in treatment enhances, not detracts, from security.  
Patients who believe they will be discharged to the community if 
treatment of their mental condition is successful are less likely to attempt 
escape to secure their freedom than those who believe that treatment is a 
sham, or is nonexistent, or that they are being held indefinitely for 
punishment.370 
The problem is particularly acute for patients classified as SVPs.  
Almost all of these patients completed a criminal sentence and expected 
to be released from confinement.  Instead, they were civilly 
committed—typically to a maximum security unit or facility—for an 
indeterminate period of time.  In many states, the legislature declared 
SVPs to be an “extremely dangerous group” who “have personality 
disorders and/or mental abnormalities which are unamenable to existing 
mental illness treatment modalities,” that their “prognosis for cur[e] . . . 
is poor,” and that their “treatment needs . . . are very long term.”371  
SVPs do not believe that they will be released even if they participate in 
treatment programs available to them and even if their treatment is 
successful.372  And they may be right. 
 
 369. People v. Ortega, 487 N.Y.S.2d 939, 947 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (referring to  
Matteawan and Dannemora State Hospitals), aff’d, 499 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. Div. 1986), 
appeal granted, 497 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 505 N.E.2d 613 (N.Y. 1987).  Both 
Matteawan and Dannemora State Hospitals were maximum security mental hospitals. 
 370. However, the promise of hospital discharge if treatment is successful is not a 
panacea for all classes of patients.  For example, a sentence-serving prisoner who faces 
return to prison and not community placement if hospital treatment is successful may not 
be motivated to cooperate with treatment.  Similarly, a mentally incompetent criminal 
defendant who faces return to court for trial and potential imprisonment thereafter if 
hospital treatment is successful may not be motivated to cooperate with treatment.  In 
these cases, the patient may attempt escape to avoid post-hospital confinement that is 
viewed as less desirable. 
 371. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002); see supra note 320. 
 372. SVP program staff are reluctant “to predict nonrecidivism, given the general 
difficulties of making predictions in this area, as well as the high costs to the clinical 
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Atascadero State Hospital, for example, has developed a five-phase, 
state-of-the-art, cognitive-behavioral therapy program for SVPs.373  
Upon admission to Atascadero, SVPs are placed in phase one.  If they 
are willing to participate in treatment, they move through the various 
phases, acquiring and practicing skills, such as anger management, stress 
reduction, and coping with high-risk situations, to prepare them for a 
return to society.  In phase five, they are placed outside the institution in 
a supervised, conditional release outpatient program.374  Of the 471 
SVPs placed in Atascadero since the law was enacted in 1996, 392 
(83.2%) remain in phase one.  Only sixty-six SVPs (14.0%) are in phase 
two, eleven (2.3%) are in phase three, two (.004%) are in phase four, and 
none are in, or have ever been placed in, phase five.375  One patient 
completed phase four and could have been released into a conditional 
release program, but he rejected, as too onerous, the conditions placed 
upon him for release, and he remains confined in Atascadero.376 
 
evaluator of false-negative predictions and the low cost of making false-positive ones.”  
Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 
4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 505, 544 (1998). 
 373. An American Psychiatric Association Task Force reported that treatment of 
paraphilic behavior today “generally includes cognitive-behavior treatment with a strong 
focus on relapse prevention and the use of medications to reduce sexual drive, including 
medroxyprogesterone acetate, and, more recently, serotonin reuptake inhibitors.”  AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS 75 (1999).  The Task Force found 
“that cognitive-behavior and relapse prevention techniques are more successful and more 
accepted treatments than psychodynamic treatment, although treatment efficacy is 
controversial for every approach.”  Id. at 170–71.  Behavior therapies enable persons 
with paraphilia to gain control over paraphilic behavior by blocking or reducing the 
person’s thoughts of, fantasies about, and urges toward deviant objects or behavior.  Id. 
at 62.  Pharmacological treatment with antiandrogens and hormonal agents reduces 
recidivism by persons with paraphilia by reducing sexual fantasies, sexual arousal, and 
sexual behavior.  Id. at 118. 
Sentence-serving convicts have an incentive to participate and succeed in mental 
treatment programs if a positive treatment outcome increases the possibility of the 
prisoner’s release on parole.  Nevertheless, sex offenders typically receive no treatment 
for their mental conditions when they are serving their penal sentences.  See Winick, 
supra note 372, at 540–44.  Delaying treatment for sexual predators until they serve their 
penal sentences and are committed as SVPs has been characterized as a “blatantly 
antitherapeutic approach.”  Id. at 542.  The American Psychiatric Association Task Force 
specifically recommends that convicted sex offenders have the opportunity to participate 
voluntarily in cognitive-behavior treatment programs while they are serving their 
criminal sentences.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra at 162, 177. 
 374. Patrick S. Pemberton & Maria T. Garcia, Inside Atascadero State Hospital: 
Debt to Society vs. Threat to Society, TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo County, Cal.), Nov. 18, 
2001, at A1.  The phases include treatment readiness, skill acquisition, skill application, 
and discharge preparation.  Id. 
 375. Statistical information dated Oct. 2, 2002, distributed to members of the 
Atascadero State Hospital Advisory Board, Dec. 12, 2002 (on file with author).  The 
total SVP population was erroneously reported as 452 patients, although the number of 
SVP patients in all treatment phases actually totaled 471. 
 376. The patient, Patrick Ghilotti, initially agreed to the conditions for release, 
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Although the Hendricks Court held that incapacitation of untreatable 
SVPs may itself be a legitimate end of the civil law,377 the Court noted 
that Kansas’s ancillary goal was to provide treatment to SVPs if such 
treatment was possible.378  By furnishing treatment to those who are 
treatable, the state establishes that its purpose is not to punish.379 
Despite increasing evidence that cognitive-behavioral treatment 
programs are effective and do significantly reduce recidivism by sex 
offenders,380 many people believe that SVPs are untreatable.  SVPs are 
typically diagnosed with a paraphilia,381 a mental disorder involving 
recurrent sexual urges and behavior involving children or other 
 
including taking Lupron, a testosterone-reducing drug that produces unpleasant and 
medically adverse side effects, wearing a global positioning system device so that his 
movements could be monitored, and participating in group therapy sessions.  However, 
he ultimately refused to accept additional conditions that restricted visits with his wife 
and use of the Internet.  Kim Curtis, Serial Rapist at ASH May Go Free, TRIBUNE (San 
Luis Obispo County, Cal.), Nov. 30, 2001, at A1.  The district attorney petitioned to 
recommit Ghilotti as an SVP to a two-year term of hospital confinement and treatment.  
People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 954 (Cal. 2002).  Although two 
psychologist evaluators determined that Ghilotti no longer met the statutory criteria for 
SVP commitment, id. at 955, the California Supreme Court ruled that the evaluators’ 
recommendations against recommitment were invalid if they were influenced by the 
evaluators’ legal error in misinterpreting the “likely to reoffend” standard, id. at 954, 
963–67.  In the Ghilotti case, the court interpreted the “likely to reoffend” standard to 
mean a substantial danger, but not a better than even chance of new sexual violence.  Id. 
at 954, 967–77.  The case was remanded for further proceedings, id. at 954, 977, and 
Ghilotti remains confined at Atascadero as an SVP, see supra note 348. 
 377. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 365–66 (1997). 
 378. See id. at 366–67. 
 379. Id. at 368 n.4.  The Supreme Court noted as significant the fact that Hendricks 
was placed in the Kansas Department of Health and Social and Rehabilitative Services and 
was housed in a unit segregated from the general prison population that was operated by 
trained individuals who were not employees of the Department of Corrections.  Id. at 368. 
 380. Brief of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner, Hendricks (No. 95-1649), available at 1996 WL 471027, at *11 
(1996) (citing numerous studies); see also Brief of the Menninger Foundation et al. as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hendricks (No. 95-1649), available at 1996 WL 
470942, at *26–29 (1996) (discussing the evolution of psychiatric treatment for SVPs 
and concluding, “modern psychiatry offers a host of beneficial treatments for SVPs”).  In 
his Hendricks dissent, Justice Breyer cited these two amicus briefs for the proposition 
that SVPs are treatable, and he noted: “Indeed, no one argues to the contrary.”  
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 381. Indeed, SVP legislation in some states specifically identifies paraphilia as the 
mental disorder that may qualify a person an SVP.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
36-3701 (West Supp. 2002) (defining mental disorder as “a paraphilia, personality 
disorder or conduct disorder or any combination of paraphilia, personality disorder and 
conduct disorder that predisposes a person to commit sexual acts to such a degree as to 
render the person a danger to the health and safety of others”). 
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nonconsenting persons.382  SVPs, however, are also often diagnosed as 
psychopathic, a personality disorder featuring “manipulativeness, 
pathological lying, shallow affect, and denial of responsibility.”383  After 
all, SVP laws are successor legislation to sexual psychopath laws.384  
Psychopaths are believed to be untreatable385 because their deficits in 
learning and affect are assumed to be inborn and immutable.386  
Nevertheless, a recent study funded by the National Institute for Mental 
Health and the MacArthur Foundation, reveals that violence potential is 
significantly reduced for psychopathic civil psychiatric patients who are 
actively involved in therapy, even on an outpatient basis.387  
Psychopathic patients who received seven or more standard outpatient 
treatment sessions388 during a ten-week period were approximately three 
times less likely to be violent during a subsequent ten-week period than 
those who received fewer or no treatment sessions.389  “These findings,” 
claimed the researchers, “challenge our conception of psychopathy as an 
inalterable personality disorder that directly elevates violence risk and 
eviscerates treatment efforts.”390  Instead of viewing psychopaths as 
incurable and diverting scarce clinical resources to more treatable 
patients, this study suggests “that concentrating treatment resources on 
the high-risk group of patients with psychopathic traits may be 
maximally efficient in terms of violence reduction.”391  If involuntary 
 
 382. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) 566 (4th ed. 2000).  In its amicus brief to the Supreme Court 
in Hendricks, the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers noted that two forms 
of paraphilia—pedophilia and sexual sadism—are paraphilias that are included within 
the DSM and are encompassed within the definition of “mental abnormality” in the 
Kansas SVP Act.  Brief of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hendricks, (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 471027, at *7.  
Although rape, which is “widely recognized by experts in the treatment and assessment 
of sex offenders to constitute a legitimate diagnostic category,” is a paraphilia, it is not 
included within the DSM as a mental disorder and is not encompassed within the 
definition of “mental abnormality” in the Kansas SVP statute.  Id. at *7–8. 
 383. Jennifer L. Skeem, John Monahan, & Edward P. Mulvey, Psychopathy, 
Treatment Involvement, and Subsequent Violence Among Civil Psychiatric Patients, 26 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 577, 578 (2002). 
 384. See supra note 290. 
 385. Indeed, the prevailing notion is that treatment is not merely ineffective for 
psychopaths, but that such treatment is iatrogenic, that is, the treatment makes 
psychopaths more likely to recidivate violently.  Skeem, Monahan & Mulvey, supra note 
383, at 577–81, 594 (discussing empirical studies that found treatment of psychopaths to 
be ineffective or iatrogenic). 
 386. Id. at 578. 
 387. See id. at 594, 598–99. 
 388. The authors described these sessions as “traditional outpatient mental health 
services” and “treatment as usual.”  Id. at 595. 
 389. Id. at 594. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 598.  Only eight percent of psychopathic patients who received seven or 
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commitment of specially categorized patients is truly a “civil” 
commitment, and not simply more punishment for those we fear, then 
society must be prepared to provide the treatment necessary for them to 
achieve release without resort to escape. 
Indeed, Texas has recently enacted SVP legislation that differs from 
other states’ SVP legislation in one important respect: Upon a 
determination that the person is an SVP, he is committed for outpatient 
treatment.392  Although the SVP must comply with numerous requirements 
imposed to ensure his compliance with treatment and supervision and to 
protect society,393 and although the outpatient status continues until he is 
no longer likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence,394 Texas 
SVPs are not subject to inpatient treatment.395  Texas’s reliance on 
outpatient treatment of SVPs may prove to be a preferable alternative to 
indeterminate, and potentially lifetime, inpatient confinement for this 
population.  When we punish SVPs for the despicable crimes they 
commit, we treat them as responsible adults.  If we release them at the 
end of their penal sentences—even with stringent requirements to assure 
they undergo treatment and to protect society—we treat them as 
responsible adults.  If they violate those requirements and we punish 
them for doing so,396 again, we treat them as responsible adults.  Such 
consistent treatment of SVPs affirms the moral legitimacy of the 
criminal law.397 
 
more outpatient treatment sessions during the first ten weeks after hospital discharge 
were violent during the ten subsequent weeks, compared with twenty-four percent of 
psychopathic patients who received six or fewer outpatient treatment sessions.  Id. 
 392. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081 (Vernon Supp. 2003).  The law 
passed the Texas Legislature in 1999 and was signed into law by then Texas Governor, 
now United States President, George W. Bush.  1999 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 1188, § 4.01. 
 393. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.082 (Vernon Supp. 2003). 
 394. Id. § 841.081. 
 395. See Rahn Kennedy Bailey, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent 
Predators: A Unique Texas Approach, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 525, 525–32 
(discussing the exclusive use of outpatient treatment and supervision in Texas as an 
alternative to inpatient commitment of SVPs). 
 396. In Texas, an SVP who violates a requirement imposed on him for outpatient 
commitment engages in a felony.  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.085 
(Vernon Supp. 2003). 
 397. Eric Janus asserted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hendricks, upholding 
the constitutionality of SVP inpatient civil commitment, places at risk “the moral 
legitimacy of the criminal law.”  Eric S. Janus, Hendricks and the Moral Terrain of Police 
Power Civil Commitment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 297, 322 (1998).  The line between 
civil and criminal is obliterated if a state can punish a person as criminally responsible for 
his actions and then, upon completion of that sentence, civilly commit him as mentally 
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C.  Clarifying the Authority to Apprehend Escapees 
In those few cases in which appropriate security measures and 
enhanced treatment opportunities do not prevent the escape of a special 
civilly committed patient, authority to apprehend the escapee and to 
return him to the mental treatment facility should be clearly articulated.  
For example, a New York statute provides that if an insanity acquittee 
escapes, the facility staff shall immediately notify the state police, the 
sheriff of the county where the escape occurred, and any person the 
facility believes to be in danger.  Any peace officer is empowered to 
apprehend, restrain, transport to, and return the escapee to the facility 
from which the escape occurred.398  In the District of Columbia, a statute 
requires the court that ordered the insanity acquittee’s confinement, upon 
the government’s request, to order the acquittee’s return to the hospital 
from which the escape occurred.  That return order is effective 
throughout the United States.  Any judicial officer within whose 
jurisdiction the escaped person is found is required to apprehend the 
escapee and deliver him for return to the hospital.399  Similarly, other 
statutes establish peace officer authority to return regular civilly 
committed mental patient escapees.400 
Peace officers attempting to apprehend escapees need the assistance of 
their co-professionals in other law enforcement organizations, and the 
authority to provide that assistance should be specified.  For example, 
when Ronald Rogers escaped from Atascadero and fled north toward 
Oregon, California peace officers desired to use the computerized index 
of identification, criminal identification, crime, and other records in the 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC), established and maintained 
 
abnormal and unable to control his dangerousness.  See Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, 
Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250 (1998). 
It is utterly paradoxical to claim that a sexually violent predator is sufficiently 
responsible to deserve the stigma and punishment of criminal incarceration, 
but that the predator is not sufficiently responsible to be permitted the usual 
freedom from involuntary civil commitment that even very predictably 
dangerous but responsible agents retain . . . . 
Id. at 258. 
 398. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(19) (McKinney 1994). 
 399. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-501(i) (2001). 
 400. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358.5 (West 1998) (providing that a mental 
health conservator may request a peace officer to detain and return his conservatee to the 
mental health facility from which the escape occurred); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. L. § 29.19 
(McKinney 2002) (providing that at the request of a representative of a facility from 
which a civilly committed patient escaped, “any peace officer, acting pursuant to his 
special duties, or any police officer who is a member of an authorized police department 
or force or of a sheriff’s department” may apprehend, transport, and return the escapee to 
the facility from which the escape occurred). 
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by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.401  They believed, however, that 
such information was only available to them if they were seeking to 
arrest an individual who committed either a state or federal crime.402  For 
this reason, they sought and obtained warrants for Rogers’s arrest, 
charging him with the nonexistent crime of escape and of unlawful flight 
to avoid prosecution.403  Nevertheless, even under current law, access to 
NCIC information is also available for persons who are missing and who 
are under a proven mental disability.404  Conceivably, Rogers could have 
been considered a missing person for the purpose of accessing the NCIC 
database.  If this interpretation is incorrect, the law should be amended 
to assure access to that database by peace officers seeking to apprehend 
mental patient escapees.  Similarly, federal extradition laws should be 
amended to allow the return of an apprehended mental patient escapee to 
the state from which the escapee departed.405 
Assuring needed assistance in the apprehension of mental patient 
escapees seems preferable to criminalizing patient escapees simply 
because such assistance is not assured.  Criminalizing a patient’s escape 
can have devastating results for the patient.  In California, for example, 
the definition of SVP requires that the person be “convicted of a sexually 
violent offense against two or more victims.”406  If SVP escape is 
criminalized, then an SVP’s escape may well constitute a third strike 
against him, resulting in a twenty-five year to life penal sentence.407  
Although he completed his sentence for the sex crimes he committed 
and cannot be further punished for those acts, we were able to civilly 
commit him to incapacitate him from committing future sex crimes.  But 
if the SVP’s escape is criminalized, we will be able to punish him by 
imprisoning him for life.  Are we doing so because he committed 
another heinous sex crime and deserves punishment for that act?  No, he 
did not commit that crime.  We claim we are punishing him because he 
 
 401. See 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2000). 
 402. Interview with L.J. Holt, Chief of Police Services, Atascadero State Hospital, 
in Atascadero, Cal. (Aug. 8, 2002). 
 403. Id.; see supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text. 
 404. Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC), Federation of American Scientists, at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). 
 405. See supra note 7 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1073, which authorizes federal 
prosecution for the crime of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution or extradition to the 
state from which the arrestee escaped to face state criminal charges). 
 406. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West Supp. 2003). 
 407. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)–(i) (West 1999); id. § 1170.12 (West Supp. 2003). 
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is dangerous and escaped nonpenal confinement for isolation and 
treatment of that dangerous condition.  Does he really deserve lifetime 
punishment for that act?  Or should he be returned, as are other escaping 
civilly committed patients, to the treatment facility from which he 
escaped?  In reality, we want to punish him simply because he is an 
SVP, and we believe he has not been punished enough for the sex crimes 
he previously committed.  Perhaps, if we really want to continue 
punishing SVPs, even though they served their criminal sentences for 
the sex crimes they committed, we should decrease security and make it 
easy for them to escape, so we can prosecute them for escape. 
D.  Perceiving Patients, Not Prisoners 
In the middle ages, mentally disordered persons were treated as 
criminals.  Mental disorder was thought to have a diabolical source, and 
the evil spirits had to be exorcized from their victims by flagellation, 
scourging, burning, and other forms of torture.  At that time, confinement 
for purposes of “treatment” was accomplished by chaining the unfortunate 
recipients in dungeons and jails along with other criminals.408 
Today, mental disorder is considered a medical or biological 
problem—a result of organic or chemical conditions within the 
person.409  Mental patients are treated with psychotropic medication and 
brief psychotherapeutic intervention.  When involuntary treatment is 
required, patients are typically detained for short periods in community 
treatment settings. 
But not so for “special” civilly committed mental patients whose lives 
have been tainted by their involvement in the criminal law—twice-
cursed410 as mad and bad.411  We hate mentally ill ex-convicts.  We 
 
 408. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELF., MENTAL ILLNESS AND ITS TREATMENT 
PAST & PRESENT 5 (1965); S.J. BARROWS, THE CRIMINAL INSANE IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, S. DOC. NO. 273, at 5 (1898). 
 409. See REISNER ET AL., supra note 96, at 5.  This model of mental disorder is 
known as the medical model.  Other models of mental disorder exist, including 
psychoanalytic, behavioral, and social/family systems models.  These alternative models 
focus on psychosocial issues.  Id. 
 410. But cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1, lines 
184–87 (William George Clarke & William Aldis Wright eds., 1987). 
The quality of mercy is not strain’d, 
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven 
Upon the place beneath: It is twice bless’d 
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 411. Our attitude regarding mentally disordered persons who are or who have been 
involved in the criminal law is a prime example of sanism.  As described by Michael 
Perlin, “‘sanism’ is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other 
irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, 
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believe they have not been punished enough for their crimes.  We detest 
mentally incompetent criminal defendants.  We believe they are guilty, 
but their current mental condition precludes us from holding a trial to 
establish their guilt so that we may impose appropriate punishment.  We 
despise insanity acquittees.  We know they have committed criminal acts 
but their mental condition at the time they acted precludes us from 
imposing punishment upon them.  We are confident that they tricked the 
jury into finding them not responsible.  We believe that SVPs are the 
very personification of evil.  For their sins, they deserve more than mere 
mortal punishment—they deserve eternal damnation.  Treatment, 
rehabilitation, and release for these monsters?  So that they may prey 
upon new victims?  We pray not. 
Although we cannot punish these special mental patients, we use the 
civil commitment process to continue their incarceration.  We claim we 
are doing so to incapacitate them so that they cannot commit dangerous 
acts.  But their confinement is a surrogate for punishment.412  If they 
escape, we want to treat them, not as other civilly committed mental 
patients, but as criminals. 
In 1898, S.J. Barrows observed: “Ask what a State does with its insane 
prisoners, ask how it protects society on the one hand and fulfills its duty 
to an irresponsible member on the other, and we may judge of its degree 
of advancement in civilization by the response.”413  By that measure, we 






sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.”  Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice 
Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law 
Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 4 (1999); see Michael L. Perlin, 
On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 388–406 (1992) (discussing the concept of sanism). 
 412. An American Psychiatric Association task force studying dangerous sex 
offenders asserted that sexual predator commitment statutes “reflect a backlash against 
determinate sentencing reform and are devised to extend the punishment of sex offenders 
and to protect society. . . .  [D]rafters of sexual predator commitment statutes have 
attempted to cloak their quasi-punitive intent in the language of medical commitment.”  
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 373, at 172–73.  The task force urged psychiatry to 
“vigorously oppose these statutes in order to preserve the moral authority of the 
profession and to ensure continuing societal confidence in the medical model of civil 
commitment.”  Id. at 173. 
 413. BARROWS, supra note 408, at 8. 
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